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ABSTRACT
ALARM FORECASTING IN NATURAL GAS PIPELINES

Colin Quinn, B.S.

Marquette University, 2020

This thesis examines alarm forecasting methods for a natural gas production
pipeline to assure the efficient transportation of high-quality natural gas. Natural gas
production companies use pipelines to transport natural gas from the extraction well to a
distribution point. Forecasting natural gas pipeline pressure alarms helps control room
operators maintain a functioning pipeline and avoid costly down time. As gas enters the
pipeline and travels to the distribution point, it is expected that the gas meets certain
specifications set in place by either state law or the customer receiving the gas. If the gas
meets these standards and is accepted at the distribution point, the pipeline is referred to
as being in a steady-state. If the gas does not meet these standards, the production
company runs the risk of being shut-in, or being unable to flow any more gas through the
distribution point until the poor-quality gas is removed.
Sensors are used to collect real-time gas quality information from within the pipe,
and alarms are used to alert the control operators when a threshold is exceeded. If
operators fail to keep the pipeline’s gas quality within an acceptable range, the company
risks being shut-in or rupturing the pipeline. Predicting gas quality alarms enables
operators to act earlier to avoid being shut-in and is a form of predictive maintenance.
We forecast alarms by using a 10th-order autoregressive model, autoregressive
model with exogenous variable, simple exponential smoothing with drift (Theta Method)
and an artificial neural network with alarm thresholds. The alarm thresholds are defined
by the production company and are occasionally adjusted to meet current environment
conditions.
The results of the alarm forecasting method show that we accurately
forecast natural gas pipeline alarms up to a 30-minute time horizon. This translates into
sensitivity rates that drop from around 100% at one minute to 82.7% at a 30-minute
forecast horizon. This means that at 30 minutes, we correctly forecast 82.7% of the
alarms. All alarm forecasting models outperform the state-or-the-art forecaster used by
the production company, with the artificial neural network performing the best.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to Natural Gas Production
This thesis examines alarm forecasting methods for a natural gas production
pipeline to assure the efficient transportation of high-quality natural gas. Our goal is to
help a natural gas production company transition from maintaining the pipeline reactively
to carrying out predictive maintenance. Predictive maintenance is acting based on
forewarning to find or mitigate degradation [1]. This thesis explores four real-time alarm
prediction methods used to detect the onset of system degradation so that flow assurance
is maintained within the pipeline.
Flow assurance is a term used in the hydrocarbon production industry to refer to
ensuring a continuous stream of natural gas from the extraction reservoir to the
distribution (sales) point [2]. As an infrastructure, natural gas pipelines are vulnerable to
damaging conditions that threaten flow assurance and warrant action, resulting in a loss
of profit and extra labor. To warn pipeline control operators of these damaging
conditions, alarms are used to monitor the health of the pipeline and alert control
operators when action is needed. Acting after an alarm has been triggered is often more
costly to carry out because damage has already occurred, leading to shutdowns, loss of
profit, and dangerous environments. Avoidance of unprofitable consequences can be
achieved through this work on early detection of alarms within non-stationary streaming
time series data. The alarm forecasting algorithms described in this work aid pipeline
controllers in achieving flow assurance and allow them to conduct preventative
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maintenance to decrease operation cost, unsafe environments, and damage to the
environment.
This work is sponsored by a natural gas production company operating in
southwest Texas. To protect sensitive information being exposed from this thesis, some
data, names, and particular details have been altered to meet the nondisclosure agreement
made between the natural gas production company and Marquette University. In March
2018, the sponsoring production company met Marquette University’s GasDay lab to
discuss the possible development of predictive algorithms for early alarm detection in a
natural gas production pipeline. In April 2018, a project proposal was agreed upon by
both the production company and Marquette University, and development began on
phase one alarm forecasting models. Since April 2018, the GasDay lab has worked
closely with pipeline controllers of the production company to understand how the
pipeline operates, what their alarm prediction needs are, and to implement real-time
forecasting algorithms in their system controls. This research is conducted at the GasDay
lab within Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The focus of this research is
applicable to both the natural gas industry and other university research labs. The
language, industry-related terms, and processes used in this thesis reflect those used at the
production company sponsoring this work.

1.1

Chapter Objectives

This chapter introduces the objective of this thesis. Beginning with this project’s
highest level of abstraction, we provide an overview of the natural gas production
process. Then, we give a closer look at production company standards and how they
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maintain an economical operation. This will lead to the definition of a pipeline alarm and
how alarms are used to help pipeline operators reactively service the pipeline. This
introduces the forecasted alarm and the benefits of preventative maintenance in the
production process. Finally, we give a brief survey of this research project as a whole and
a summary of the remaining chapters.

1.2

Introduction to Natural Gas Production Pipelines

Natural gas production companies use pipelines to transport natural gas from
point A to point B. Point A is where the gas is extracted from the earth, and point B is
where the gas is sold to distributors. Figure 1.1 depicts this transfer.

Figure 1.1: A natural gas pipeline transporting gas from point A to point B
Natural gas production companies strive to complete this task as efficiently and costeffectively as possible. A production company operating at full capacity simultaneously
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extracts gas from the ground at point A, transports it through the pipeline, and sells it at
point B twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week [3]. The pipeline connecting these
two points plays a critical role in this operation, as its throughput determines whether the
production company’s revenue outweighs the cost of operation.
A natural gas production pipeline requires billions of dollars of infrastructure and
highly skilled people to operate correctly [4], [5]. There are numerous moving parts in a
natural gas production company that are interdependent. The profit margin of a
production company depends on the success of transporting gas from A to B, and can
vary widely from day to day. Until the last few years, the state-of-the-art solution to
ensure reliable production and transportation of natural gas was with human pipeline
operators and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [6]. Although
pipeline operators are experts in the field of natural gas production, and there have been
large technological advancements in SCADA software and pipeline monitoring [7], the
growing demand for natural gas as an energy source requires new tools to help automate
the production process.
The extraction, processing, and transportation of the natural gas is called the
upstream operation of the natural gas industry [5], [8]. This research concentrates on the
upstream operation and the flow assurance of a production pipeline (successful
transportation of natural gas through a pipeline). The goal of this project is to enhance the
current error-prone processes of upstream operations with the modern advancements of
data analysis and prediction. Problems can occur in the pipeline that can slow or stop the
flow of gas. Alarms are used to notify pipeline control operators that a problem is
occurring and that action is needed. Alarm forecasting allows the pipeline operators to act
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before an alarm is triggered, which minimizes downtime and reduces the number of
potential errors in day-to-day operations. If a pipeline operator can detect a problem that
will slow production with a forecasted alarm, there is less chance of the operation
slowing or halting. Improving this upstream operation returns a larger amount of gas
being sold to the distribution vendors, increasing profits and protecting equipment from
long-term damage.
There are many opportunities for error in upstream operations of a production
company. The most common errors on which this thesis focuses are found in the quality
and characteristics of the gas in the pipeline. The quality of gas refers to the chemical
makeup of the natural gas, while the gas’s pressure, heat content, and flow rates within
the pipeline represent the gas’s characteristics. The alarms that alert a pipeline controller
to a problem correspond to these conditions. To understand what a natural gas pipeline
alarm is, how it is used in the production process, and the potential benefit of a forecasted
alarm, the next section presents the production process.

1.3

Natural Gas Production

The natural gas production procedure discussed in this section provides a
simplified version summarized in three steps. This overview of production sets up the
remaining sections in this chapter and represents the highest level of abstraction needed
to recognize the contribution of this thesis. Figure 1.2 can be used as a visual
representation of each step in the production procedure.
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Figure 1.2: Steps in the production procedure
The first step of the upstream operation is to extract natural gas from the earth.
Natural gas is accessed using an extraction well, an aperture encased in concrete and steel
used to access deposits of natural gas deep within the earth [6]. There are a number of
drilling techniques that have made natural gas and other hydrocarbon resource extraction
more efficient over the last decade [9], [10], [11], [12]. These techniques will not be
covered in this work. However, the advancements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal
drilling have made the U.S. the world’s leading natural gas producer at 30 trillion cubic
feet in 2018, 31% of the total U.S. primary energy consumption [12]. At the top of these
extraction wells, pumps are used to extract the gas slowly from small pockets in rock
formations or other hydrocarbon reservoirs [13]. Once extracted, a gathering system
made up of several small-diameter lines take the extracted natural gas from the wellhead
to a central processing facility [14]. The natural gas in the underground reservoir and in
the gathering lines is known as raw natural gas. The chemical makeup of raw natural gas
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differs from the quality of gas allowed in the main pipeline. Raw natural gas contains
impurities that must be removed before being pressurized and injected into the main line.
Processing plants are used to collect the gas from the low-pressure gathering lines,
process the gas to pipeline quality, and inject it into the pipeline.
The second step in natural gas production is to process the raw natural gas into
pipeline quality gas. Natural gas is composed of combustible hydrocarbons, gases, water,
and oil [15]. Processing raw natural gas involves separating non-methane hydrocarbons
and other impurities from the gas [4]. The plants equipped to do this are known as central
processing facilities (CPF) and are located near wells along the pipeline. The raw natural
gas drawn from the wellhead consists of both heavy and light hydrocarbons [4]. In
general, processing raw natural gas removes water and the heavy hydrocarbons (ethane,
propane, butane, and pentane) to achieve a quality considered acceptable to transport in a
pipeline [3], [5]. Regulations set by either state law or by the customer receiving the gas
require the gas to meet certain specifications [6]. Specifics of what hydrocarbons are
removed from the gas specific to this project will be discussed in the following section on
natural gas processing.
The byproducts created while processing natural gas are also valuable and are
collected for future sale. There are multiple side-operations taking place during this
refining process to capture profitable substances [5]. Byproducts such as liquefied
natural gas (LNG) can be separated from the hydrocarbon stream and sold. Although out
of the scope of this project, such byproducts can be equally valuable as pipeline quality
natural gas, and entirely different processes are carried out to retrieve them [16]. Not all
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production companies process natural gas the same, as equipment varies from pipeline to
pipeline and depends on the size of the operation.
The final step of the production process is to flow the gas down the pipeline to be
sold at a distribution point. In some instances, a pipeline may have several CPF’s
operating in parallel, all injecting natural gas into the main pipe simultaneously. This
means that the gas arriving at the distribution point is really a combination of gas from
several wells from further up the line. The production pipeline operates in a similar way,
with Figure 1.3 depicting a version of this coalescent gas stream.

Figure 1.3: Four wells simultaneously injecting gas into the line as the gas flows to the
distribution point
No two natural gas wells are identical, and the chemical make-up of each well
results in different quality gas being injected post-processing [5]. Even the gas extracted
in the morning can be different from the gas taken from the same well the day before [6].
This is an important concept to this work, as the quality of gas being received at the
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distribution point determines whether the gas will be purchased. The quality of gas can
fluctuate, which is why the pipeline control room monitors the condition of the natural
gas within the pipeline to coordinate its processing before it reaches the distribution
point. After the three steps described in this section, the production company hopes to
have a high-quality natural gas that the distributors will purchase.

1.4

Composition of Natural Gas and Production Company Standards

Now that a general overview of the natural gas production process has been
presented, this section describes the alarm-triggering situations that arise in daily
operations. As previously described, the errors that occur in the production process
normally concern the quality of natural gas being received at the distribution point. This
section will begin by giving a brief introduction to natural gas found in the U.S.A. and
then move into the specifics of the gas being produced from the wells along the
sponsoring production company’s pipeline. The company standards will be discussed in
relation to the distributor’s needs, which will transition to alarm forecasting.
Extraction wells found in the U.S.A. produce one of two types of natural gas:
conventional or nonconventional gas (Figure 1.4). Conventional gas can be extracted
with traditional (vertical) drilling techniques and can be found in geological formations
that are generally more accessible and straightforward to develop [6], [17]. Conventional
natural gas is either associated or non-associated with crude oil. Associated gas is found
in oil wells, where the gas can be separate from the oil (free gas) or dissolved into the
crude oil (dissolved gas) [6]. If the well is producing dissolved gas, the oil must be
separated from the gas at the wellhead and thoroughly processed before transit. The oil
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and other byproducts from the processing are captured and sold. Non-associated gas
wells produce gas that is mixed with little to no crude oil less and requires less postextraction processing.

Figure 1.4: Visual representation of conventional and unconventional gas wells
accessing natural gas formations
Unconventional gas is held in formations that are accessed with newer drilling
techniques and only recently have proved an economically viable alternative to
conventional gas wells [18]. Unconventional gas is found in reservoirs with low
permeability, meaning the gas is trapped in the formation and is unable to flow through
the tight sands that hold it [19]. Coalbed methane, tight gas, and shale gas are nonassociated and often extracted from these formations with vertical and horizontal drilling.
Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking make natural gas one of the most abundant
resources in the U.S. The gas measured in this project comes from both conventional and
unconventional non-associated gas wells. Operating over 3 million acres, the production
company operates different wells, and each well produces a different type of gas.
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The natural gas resource for this project is a part of the Permian Basin, located in
southwest Texas, primarily in Reeves County (Figure 1.5). There, a pipeline spanning
approximately 70 miles across the basin carries gas from extraction wells that generate
the pressure and gas quality signals used in this work. This work will concentrate on four
of the wells along the pipeline flowing towards a single distribution point, similar as to
what Figure 1.3 depicts. Of these four wells, all are producing non-associated natural gas
but vary in chemical makeup. To distinguish between the different types of gas at these
wells, the gas is further classified into either wet (rich) or dry (lean) gas.

Figure 1.5: The Permian Basin located in Reeves Country, Texas (highlighted in blue)
The difference between wet and dry natural gas is the amount of recoverable
hydrocarbons present in the gas [5]. The terms wet and dry natural gas are often used in
the production pipeline’s control room to describe the quality of gas in the pipeline. If the
line is heavy with wet gas, it is more likely that an alarm will be triggered and errors will
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occur. If dry gas is flowing through the line, the control room is comfortable with current
operations and may even try to increase the pipe’s throughput. Understanding the
differences between these two types of gas provides intuition for the problems that occur
in a pipeline, thus a formal definition of natural gas’ chemical makeup is provided.
Natural gas is a naturally occurring combustible hydrocarbon gas. The typical
chemical composition of natural gas consists of primarily methane (CH4) and less
prominent hydrocarbons. The less prominent hydrocarbons — Ethane, Propane, Butane,
etc. – are impurities and processed out before transportation. Table 1.1 shows the typical
make-up of natural gas.
The more methane present in the gas, the less processing is needed. Methanedense gas falls into the dry gas category and is more valuable than its richer counterpart.
Gas with high levels of methane already resembles pipeline quality gas and can be
produced at a faster rate. By the time natural gas is used for residential or commercial
purpose, the composition of the gas is almost pure methane [6]. Refineries are used to
achieve this near 100% methane composition in the downstream sector of the industry.
Despite raw natural gas consisting of 70-90% methane upon extraction, it must still be
processed to be considered pipeline quality dry gas. Pipeline quality gas differs from
production company to production company. However, it can be assumed that the gas
flowing through the main line is as methane-rich as possible.
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Table 1.1: Typical chemical composition of natural gas

Hydrocarbon

Chemical Formula

Percent

Methane

CH4

Ethane

C2H6

Propane

C3H8

Butane

C4H10

Carbon Dioxide

CO2

0-8%

Oxygen

O2

0-0.2%

Nitrogen

N2

0-5%

Hydrogen Sulfide

H2S

0-5%

Rare gases

A, He, Ne, Xe

trace

70-90%

0-20%

The impurities processed out of raw natural gas include water, ethane, propane,
butane, and pentanes. These associated hydrocarbons are the natural gas liquids
previously mentioned as byproducts of the processing procedure and can consist of 020% of the original chemical makeup. The more liquid content present in raw natural gas,
the richer the gas is. Rich gas, synonymous to wet gas, is removed to create a product that
has a higher sales value [18]. This removal creates lean gas, or dry gas, consisting of the
lighter hydrocarbons. Liquid content is one of the main classifiers of natural gas, with
rich gas indicating that a more rigorous processing procedure is needed, and lean gas
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indicating the gas already has a low liquid content and ultimately less processing is
needed. The heavier components of gas, such as ethane, propane, and butane are the main
contributors to the liquid content.
Pipeline quality gas is defined by regulations and customer needs. A number of
impurities can affect the final product gas being delivered to a distribution point [5].
Although gas being delivered is considered pipeline quality, impurities can be present
that effect the final consistency received at the distribution point. At the distribution
point, other companies can choose to flow gas from the production company’s pipeline
into their own. If this exchange takes place, the transaction has been made, and the
natural gas has been sold. In this transaction, the quality of gas must meet specific
conditions to be allowed to flow into the purchasing company’s pipe. As previously
stated, regulations are set by either state law or by the customer receiving the gas that the
gas meets certain specifications before the customer is allowed to accept the gas [20].
This decision of which gas to accept is made by a careful monitoring of the natural gas’s
quality in a pipeline control room.
In the production company’s control room, the pipeline is monitored and remotely
controlled. These controllers are the ones maintaining flow assurance for the pipeline and
are the first to act when a problem is present in the system. Different gas qualities are
tracked and presented to these operators to ensure high-quality gas is being received at
the distribution point. It is because of this that such a detailed explanation of raw natural
gas processing has been given thus far. If the buyer at the distribution point sees gas
arriving from the pipeline that contains an unacceptable quality, they have the option to
reject the gas from flowing into their pipeline and shutting the valve allowing the flow of
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gas. To counteract the potential problem of being unable to flow gas to the distributor,
production companies use alarms to warn pipeline controllers that issues are present.

1.5

Natural Gas Pipeline Alarms

This section defines what it means for the production company’s pipeline to be
shut in, how alarms are used in the control room, and the potential for forecasted alarms.
The actual alarm thresholds specific to this project are presented in Chapter 3 so that they
can be visualized with the time series to which they relate. In June 2018 and May 2019,
we visited the production company to learn the specifics of their pipeline operation. The
information in this section comes from what we learned during these meeting and the
remote meetings throughout the duration of this project.
If a distributor chooses to close the valve that allows the flow of gas from the
production pipeline into their own, this is called being shut in. Avoiding being shut in is
the goal of the alarm forecasting algorithms developed in this thesis. Being shut in
triggers a chain of events that is extremely costly and time-consuming for any production
company to fix. Once a distributor decides to shut in the pipeline, gas from the extraction
wells continue to flow down the pipeline and begin to pack the line with bad gas, gas that
contains a quality that exceeds contractual thresholds and is deemed unacceptable to the
distributor. While more bad gas builds up near the distribution point, the production
control room operators instruct the processing center operators to pull out of the line, or
to stop injecting more gas into the pipe. For the pipeline to become functional again, the
poor-quality gas must either be diffused with gas further down the line or flared from the
system entirely.
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Diffusing the low-quality gas is a technique practiced by the production company
that is usually the first attempt at resolving the issue of being shut in. Diffusing the line
involves slowly mixing the low-quality gas with high-quality gas in an attempt to achieve
a quality of gas acceptable to the distributor. Diffusing the gas is preferred over flaring
the system, as the gas already in the line does not need to be removed. However, flaring
the gas can take a long time to complete. Depending on how packed the line is, it is
sometimes more economically sensible to flare the gas instead of diffusing.
Flaring the pipe involves the removal of all gas from a segment of pipe.
Depending on how much bad gas in packed into the line, the flared segment of pipe can
span back from the distribution point to the majority of the main pipeline. This technique
is faster than diffusing the gas; however, it can cost anywhere from $15,000-$25,000 an
hour, plus the operation costs to extract, process, and transport that gas in the pipe. Due to
these large penalties of being shut in, many precautions are made to avoid being shut in.

1.6

Natural Gas Processing and Transportation

Natural gas often is found in remote places far from a local market [6]. For the
gas to be sold, it must be transported from its well of origin to a distributor. For decades,
pipelines have been the most secure, reliable, and economical tool for this job [3], [6],
[21], [22]. However, because raw natural gas contains impurities that must be removed
from transportation, the gas must be processed before it is injected into the pipeline. This
section breaks down the process of turning raw natural gas into pipeline quality gas, and
how each process effects the signals used to forecast pipeline alarms.
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Flow assurance is a term used in the production industry that refers to ensuring
the flow of hydrocarbons from the extraction well to the distribution sales point [2]. This
section will be concentrating on mid-stream flow assurance issues such as gas hydrate
formations, corrosion, erosion, and severe slugging within the pipeline. Each of these
flow assurance risks has the potential to slow or stop the flow of gas in the production
process. These issues are prevented by processing the impurities out of natural gas before
it is injected into the line. Within the pipe, the injected gas is monitored by sensors,
which produce the signals used to represent the real-time quality of gas. These signals are
used in the alarm prediction algorithm described in Section 4.2, and understanding how
the signal reacts to different components of the processing procedure is domain
knowledge needed to make accurate forecasts.
Consequences of flowing poor-quality gas through the pipeline fall into two
categories. The first category involves the flow assurance risks that affect the design and
integrity of the pipeline (hydrate formation, corrosion, etc.). The second consequence
stems from marketing/federal law regulations. The production company is held by a
contractual agreement to deliver a certain amount of high-quality gas to the distribution
point. CPF’s are used to control the quality of gas and the amount flown to the
distribution sales point. If this contract is not met, the company could be subject to fines
and possibly being shut in. Requirements are placed on the hydrocarbons listed in Table
1.1 as well as internal pipe pressure (measured in pounds per square inch) and the heat
content (measured in BTU) of the gas. In conjunction with distributor contracts, the
production company must meet federal regulations.
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If the poor-quality gas enters the U.S. nation’s natural gas transportation network,
the company providing the gas can be subject to increased tariffs as the poor quality gas
can affect the overall network [23]. While the definition of pipeline quality gas varies
from different organizations, the U.S. Energy Information Administration provides
general guidelines of the characteristics of pipeline quality gas. The general specifications
are:
1) The gas must be within a specific BTU range (1035 BTU per
cubic foot, +/- 50 BTU)
2) Be delivered at a specified hydrocarbon dew point temperature
level (below which any vaporized gas liquid in the mix will tend to
condense at pipeline pressure)
3) Contain no more than trace amounts of elements such as
hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen, water vapor, and
processing oxygen.
4) Be free of particulate solids and liquid water that could be
detrimental to the pipeline or its ancillary operating equipment.
List 1.1: U.S. Energy Administration’s Generalized Pipeline Quality Gas [23]
Depending on the location of the well, these guidelines become more specific to
the gas being produced in that area [8]. In this work, the pipeline quality gas
specifications are set by the distributor at the sales point, and the processed gas is well
within the federal standards. The specific pipeline quality gas is shown in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Pipeline Quality Gas Requirements for the Production Pipeline

Quality

Upper Limit

Waiver Dependent

Moisture (H2O)

≤ 7 lbs

NO

Carbone Dioxide (CO2)

≤ 2%

YES

Heat Content (BTU)

≤ 1100 BTU

YES

Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S)

≤ 5 PPM

NO

Maximum Allowable Operating
Pressure (MAOP)

≤ 1400 psi

NO

As an example of this list’s generality, the BTU content limit specified for the
production pipeline used in this work is higher than the U.S. Energy Administration’s
limits. This is allowed due to the rating at which the production company operates.
The waiver depended column of Table 1.2 refers to the contract between the
production company and distributor. In some instances, the production company or the
distributor would like to flow gas outside the limits stated in Table 1.2, so a waiver can
be activated. Reasons for activating a waiver usually has to do with a gas quality problem
farther down the line. For example, sometimes it is necessary to enrich the gas’s heat
content, so heavier hydrocarbons may be blended with the gas to offset the low BTU
levels [23]. The qualities that may not allow to be altered with a waiver are the qualities
that threaten flow assurance and the integrity of the pipeline. Flow assurance for this
project is controlled by the central processing facilities located along the pipeline and is
referred to as field processing [14]. The role of a CPF is to upgrade poor-quality gas to
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pipeline quality. Figure 1.6 shows where field processing CPF’s typically are located in
the production process.

Figure 1.6: The typical location of a field CPF processing raw natural gas into pipeline
quality gas
Generally, processing gas involves the separation of non-methane hydrocarbons
and other fluids from methane. This is a several step process [5], [6], [14], [23] that
begins at the extraction wellhead where the associated or dissolved natural gas is
separated from the crude oil. One of the main objectives of a natural gas processing is to
remove the high concentration of carbon dioxide from sour gas and other sulfur
components to meet stringent emission standards [6]. This process begins with a
conventional separator using gravity and compression to heat and cool the gas, which
allows the heavier oil and gas to sink below the lighter hydrocarbons. Then refrigeration

21
units are used to dehydrate the gas stream. This removes water and is vital in avoiding the
formation of gas hydrates in the main pipe during transportation. Once much of the water
has been removed, the gas is subjected to contaminate removal and methane separation.
Contaminate removal removes the hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, water vapor, helium,
and oxygen from the gas. This is achieved with amine gas treating, where the gas is
sweetened using aqueous solutions of alkylamines [24]. To separate the NGL from the
methane, absorptive oil is mixed with the gas stream. The absorptive oil soaks up the
NGLs (ethane, propane, butane, etc.), while methane stays in gaseous form. The NGL
and methane are separated with extreme cold temperatures, and the methane-dense gas
rises above the sinking NGLs.
After altering the chemical makeup of the raw natural gas, it is compressed and
injected into the pipeline. Compressor stations are critical to the production process and
are responsible for the flow of gas through the pipe despite elevation changes, friction,
and long distances. As the gas is compressed, heat is generated. With every 100 pounds
per square inch (psi) the gas is compressed, the heat content of the gas increases
approximately seven to eight BTU per cubic foot [25]. To counteract this, cooling units
are used so that by the time the gas is injected into the pipe, the gas is at a temperature
that the pipeline operators deem acceptable. Once the raw natural gas has been
compressed, the pressure generated by the compressor units forces the gas to flow in the
direction of the distribution point.
The signals used to forecast pipeline alarms reflect this process. Depending on
how each CPF is operating, the signals will change to reflect the current status of the
system. For example, if a refrigeration unit fails, it is likely that the gas being injected
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into the main line by that CPF is heavy with water. Subsequently, as the wet gas flows
towards the distribution point, it is likely that the H2O signal is increasing towards or
exceeding an alarm threshold. By the time the pipeline controller is alerted of the
triggered H2O alarm, the pipeline may already be shut in. Similarly, if pipeline controllers
are made aware of a marketing waiver to increase the heat content of the stream, they
may instruct a CPF to adjust their processing procedure to output ‘hotter’ gas. This
changes the behavior of the BTU and other gas quality signals.
One error in the production process at a single CPF can cause catastrophic failures
through the entire pipeline, engendering shutdowns, loss of profit, and dangerous
environments. As demand for natural gas as a clean burning fuel continues to grow, the
production industry is being pushed to operate at higher pressures [26]. Operating at
higher pressures means more pipeline throughput and requires more gas processing.
Having access to the latest technologies will provide efficient and resource-saving
improvements to production companies.

1.7

Contribution of Thesis

The use of machine learning and artificial intelligence in the energy industry has
proven itself to be beneficial and effective. However, many areas of this industry have yet
to be explored [27]. There is little work published in the field of natural gas production
pipeline alarm predicting. Based on an extensive literature review (Chapter 2), this is the
first published algorithm to predict natural gas pipeline alarms. This is due to several
reasons: First, this problem is specific to a single natural gas production company, and
second, until this point, pipeline operators have been the main source of detecting issues
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in the system. Although different production companies have different means of
production, this work can provide the foundation on which algorithms are developed to
aid their systems.

1.8

Outline of Remaining Chapters

The remaining portion of this thesis begins with a review in Chapter 2 of current
literature and work done in the field of energy forecasting and time series analysis. In
Chapter 3, we will introduce the data used in this work, anomaly detection and
imputation, and the framework for real-time alarm forecasting. Chapter 4 continues with
the implementation in several forecasting techniques: 10-order autoregressive model, 10order autoregressive model with exogenous variables, simple exponential smoothing with
drift model (Theta method), and an artificial Neural Network. Chapter 5 presents
discussion, interpretation, and comparison of the experimental results. Finally, Chapter 6
covers final thoughts such as a project summary, future work, and final words.
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CHAPTER 2
Project Relevance and Literature Review

2.1

Chapter Objectives

This chapter presents the history and context of this work, and it analyzes,
interprets, and critically evaluates the existing literature on alarm forecasting in natural
gas pipelines. Beginning with this project’s relevance and incentive, the following
sections present the reader with a background of natural gas production, pipeline
technology, and the growing need for preventative maintenance. Mathematical work will
be discussed involving modern time series, regression, and real-time error detection
applications that are reviewed and linked to alarm forecasting in the natural gas field.

2.2

Project Relevance and a Change in Natural Gas Production

To meet the growing demand for fossil fuels, natural gas production companies
need to embrace new technologies and develop more capable processes to maintain flow
assurance while simultaneously increasing production. This idea of increasing production
is not isolated to just the natural gas industry, but all the energy production industries.
The harnessing of energy through the use of new technologies has fueled the U.S.
economy since the industrial revolution [28]. As humans evolve, more energy is needed
to meet our needs. Hence, energy production has transformed over time [29]. The first
known practical use of natural gas was in 500 B.C., when the Chinese used naturally
occurring gas to boil sea water, producing salt. They achieved this using hollowed
bamboo trunks to capture the gas seeping from the earth’s surface, unknowingly making
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the world’s first natural gas pipeline [6], [30]. Although the technology has changed, we
still use the same fundamental idea today.
From a few bamboo trunks to the three million miles of carbon-steel pipe that
spans the United States today, the goal of a natural gas pipeline is still to transport gas
from its extraction point to its place-of-use [31]. Clean burning, abundant, and versatile,
natural gas consumption in the United States has doubled since the 1980s and reached an
all-time high in 2018 [32], [33]. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports a
predicted 5% rise in natural gas usage by 2050, as well as a 11% decrease in coal and a
7% decrease in nuclear energy [34]. The U.S. is the world’s leader in natural gas
production and consumption, making this energy industry a significant part of the
economy with 31% of the total U.S. energy consumption being supplied from natural gas
[12]. This continuous increase in natural gas use puts pressure on production companies
to meet the demand, extracting and flowing more natural gas through their systems than
ever before.
This surge in the production industry has come with a cost. Despite natural gas
emitting less global warming emissions than coal or oil, carbon dioxide and other heattrapping gasses are still released when natural gas is combusted [29], [35]. Drilling,
extracting, and transporting natural gas introduces the possibility of methane leakage, an
even more detrimental occurrence than carbon dioxide contributing to greenhouse gas
emissions [35]. The natural gas production industry accounted for about a third of the
methane released into the atmosphere in 2018 [6], [32], [36]. Hence, stricter
environmental regulations force industry compliance, resulting in the production
industry’s adoption of new technologies to reduce production errors. Strict emission

26
standards enforced by the U.S. government keep the increasing demand of North
America’s natural gas production and transportation in check. Production companies can
produce as much gas as they want, but are required to maintain certain standards or
otherwise be subject to penalties discussed in Chapter 1 [23]. While the environmental
impact of any hydrogen-based energy source’s production is an unfortunate trade off,
other repercussions from the production process is pressuring the natural gas industry to
find alternative solutions for safely keeping up with demand.
Over the last 40 years, pipeline accidents have killed more than 500 people,
injured 4000 more, and cost nearly seven billion dollars in property damage across the
U.S. [21]. Of these figures, natural gas production was specifically responsible for 24
deaths, 99 injures, and over a billion dollars’ worth of damage from 2010 to 2018 alone
[37]. Each accident that occurs is a blemish on the natural gas industry, rightly bring up
questions of safety and putting pressure on pipeline companies to make changes. Pipeline
failure can occur for many reasons. The most common cause is that pipelines are
becoming older and may not be maintained over time [21]. With the introduction of the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 [38], programs such as the Pipeline and
Hazardous Material Safety Administration [39] are actively enforcing federal regulations
and industry standards to force outdated production pipelines to use the new technologies
available in production.
Despite the negative environmental impacts and safety faults of the natural gas
industry, natural gas is the most energy efficient and cleanest-burning fossil fuel [29],
[40], [41], [42]. Pipelines are the most cost effective and safest ways to move natural gas
over long distances [3], [6], [21], [22]. With the affordability of today’s digital
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technologies and research in the field of natural gas production, new ways to maintain,
protect, and control pipelines are becoming more accessible than ever before. Smarter
production leads to more volume being produced, fewer errors, and responsible care for
the earth; all while supplying energy to those who rely on it.
The production company sponsoring this work is aware of the repercussions that
result from an inefficient and unsafe production process. Situations that slow or stop the
flow a gas cost the production company significant amounts of time and money to
correct. Therefore, their incentive for sponsoring this pipeline alarm forecasting project is
to remain on the leading edge of natural gas production technology and to reduce the cost
of reactively maintaining the pipeline. Searching for ways to maximize the throughput of
the pipeline projects such as this are investments for the future of the production
company and represent their first steps in predictively maintaining the pipeline.

2.3

Types of Maintenance and Natural Gas Production Technology

Without the appropriate technology to assist in the increasing demand of North
America’s natural gas consumption, outdated and under-maintained production pipelines
can result in serious financial loss for production companies and ecological disasters [43].
Once shut-in, the production company suffers a loss as pipeline workers try to identify
and correct the disruption to flow assurance. This reactive process is a fault in the
production company’s operational efficiency, and new forms of maintenance have been
introduced in an attempt to reduce downtime and expended resources. Understanding
these forms of maintenance motivates how production companies stand to benefit from
alarm forecasting in natural gas pipelines.
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Because of entropy, maintenance is required to keep anything in working
condition. A human body needs nutrition and exercise, while a gas pipeline needs
periodic cleaning and replacement of corroded or weak segments. There is value in
different kinds of maintenance to offset cost and labor and to resume common function.
According to the Federal Energy Management Program, three types of maintenance are
common [1].
Known as the “run it 'till it breaks'' model, reactive maintenance is the simplest to
adopt. Labor and capital cost is deferred until something breaks. At that point, what is
broken is fixed. No other action is taken on the machine while it is running. While
rudimentary, reactive maintenance has its advantages in low costs and less staff while
nothing is out of service. Preventative maintenance is acting based on a schedule or time
to find and mitigate degradation. This is analogous to periodically cleaning the inside of
the pipe to flush out any accumulated flow blockage. However, no amount of
preventative measures will prevent catastrophic failures, but rather decrease the number
of regular deteriorations. Predictive maintenance is based on actual measurements that
can detect the onset of system degradation. This is not based on time but rather on
condition. For production facilities, the cost and time benefit of conducting predictive
maintenance can be appreciable by saving 8% to 12% over a preventative model [1].
Historically, the natural gas production industry performs a form of reactive
maintenance [3]. This form of operation is outdated, as the maintenance is required after
the problem has occurred, and the damage has been done. Although reactive maintenance
is logical and will always be a part of a dynamic system such as natural gas processing,
new technologies allow for action to be taken before a reactive process is carried out.
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Different from the scheduled preventative maintenance carried out on a pipeline [1], [3],
[6], [44], predictive maintenance allows pipeline controllers to act before issues occur.
This is made possible through the constant monitoring of the pipeline, a control center,
and pipeline operators.
Constant monitoring of the pipeline is achieved through wireless sensor networks
(WSN) systematically installed throughout the pipeline. Digital technologies and wireless
communications allow the sensors to relay real-time information back to the pipeline
control center to help determine machinery health, plan maintenance intervals, and
reduce downtime. Especially valuable in the oil and gas industry due to extraction wells
often being in remote places, [45] shows how the deployment of wireless sensor networks
in pipelines has been a large contributor to safer and more efficient natural gas
transmission by connecting offsite pipeline controllers and onsite pipeline personnel.
Alakbarov [46] walks through the architecture of a modern WSN system and stresses the
importance of reliable communication between the pipeline and the control room. These
works point out that these sensor networks are so valuable to the production process, it is
not unusual for gas plants to employ a full-time instrument technician to ensure accurate
sensor calibration and maintain communication with the control room [6].
Pipelines often have many sensors simultaneously sending a stream of data to the
control room. This leads to a huge amount of daily data generation. Similar to the
technology used in this thesis, [47] addresses the large-scale data being communicated
from the WSN installed on pipelines using big data techniques. Once the data has been
recorded, it is communicated to the pipeline control room for immediate analysis. This

30
vital analysis is enabled by software packages that receive and parse the incoming WSN
data.
Pipeline control rooms like the one used in this research can be outfitted with
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems [6]. SCADA systems provide
highly configurable industrial hardware/software applications used to manage process
control and remote data transmission [7]. The natural gas pipeline technology overview
[3] explains the importance of these systems and how with WSN’s, SCADA systems give
pipeline operators more control over equipment, processes, and communication from
remote places. Article [48] discusses how SCADA systems continuing role in gas
production has evolved over the last 30 years, increasing recognition and popularity for
IT-based automation. Still, the coordination of a natural gas production pipeline involves
many complicated processes simultaneously occurring. Uraikul [22] explains how the
near-instantaneous information provided by SCADA systems gives pipeline controllers
the consistent, fast and reliable decision support they need to ensure safe transportation of
the large qualities of gas flowing through the pipeline.
Good pipeline controllers are familiar with the system they are operating,
knowledgeable of the tools at their disposal, and quick to recognize immediate threats to
the pipeline. They direct, control, and monitor the gas from extraction well to distribution
sales point. The importance of a qualified pipeline controller is critical to the success of
production. Thus many guides, manuals, and other relevant literature has been published
by production companies and the U.S. government to aid these workers [49], [50], [51].
These guides and regulations inform pipeline controllers of the limits within which they
can operate the pipeline as well as federal regulations. Operators follow their own set of
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guidelines, as each production pipeline is rated for different flow rates and performance.
They are the decision-makers that keep the pipeline operating and the primary users of
the alarm forecasting algorithms and the other tools described in this section. It is with
these tools and operation experts that it is possible to perform predictive maintenance on
a production pipeline.
Natural gas is being produced at unprecedented rates [52]. The only way the
modern production pipeline can ensure the most reliable, productive, and safe operation
is through the adoption of new pipeline technologies. Developments such as WSN and
SCADA enable new real-time data analysis to help production companies predictively
maintain their pipeline. New areas of research have been developing in the field of
natural gas production with the intent to manage the safe transportation of this fossil fuel.

2.4

Past Work in the Field of Natural Gas Production Pipelines

The ability to forecast natural gas alarms in production pipelines comes from a
foundation of years of research from engineers, mathematicians, and industry experts.
This section highlights some recent work leading to this thesis. The application of realtime pipeline data to forecast alarms in natural gas production pipelines is a relatively
new area of research. In fact, the definition of an alarm used in this work is not an
industry standard, rather a standard of the production company sponsoring this research.
Therefore, little work has been published in the natural gas production field that includes
the use of alarm thresholds as a form of predictive maintenance. However, there have
been many closely related works that strive to achieve the same objective of maintaining
a production pipeline using machine learning, artificial intelligence, and big data
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analytics. In most of the following work, the goal is the same: to protect the pipeline from
failure.
Continuing the theme of Chapter 1, if gas being injected into the pipeline is lowquality, numerous problems can threaten flow assurance. Three commonly found
problems in production pipelines include hydrate formation, leaks, and corrosion. Work
devoted to combating these problems is relevant to this thesis’s concentration as they all
fall under the umbrella of obstacles that our alarm forecasting is trying to overcome.
Many of the variables used to analyze and predict these problems are the same used to
forecast alarms. While we are not specifically concentrating on hydrate formation,
pipeline leaks, or corrosion, our general-case forecaster can alert controllers to the
situations in which these problems can occur or may occur in the future.
One of the three common internal issues pipelines are combating today is the
formation of natural gas hydrates. Gas hydrates are clathrate physical compounds of
water and natural gas, where the molecules in the gas are trapped in polygonal crystalline
structures made of water molecules [53]. These crystalline structures, or simply icelooking crystals, can accumulate within a pipeline, causing potentially production-halting
blockage, damage to pipeline structural integrity, and transport system equipment failure
[4]. As shown in work such as [54], hydrates can form anywhere in the pipeline where
hydrocarbons and water are present at the right temperature and pressure. Presenting an
additional concerning aspect of hydrate formations, [5] points out that they can occur
within minutes without prior warning — stressing the importance of real-time detection
systems.

33
Thus, several computational approaches address the issue of hydration formation.
Naseer [26] discusses how the formation of gas hydrates can be combated with
computational fluid dynamics, locating and predicting hydrate build up in certain sections
pipe. Research in [55] describes a method using kinetic inhibition to prevent flow channel
blockage of these hydrates. [56] follows a control strategy of using thermodynamic
inhibitors to push the hydrate formation phase boundary away from the temperature and
pressure conditions at which natural gas hydrates form. While all these approaches are
substantially different, they all rely on the data being produced within the pipeline.
Specifically, the data used to forecast alarms such as pressure, temperature, H2S, and
H2O.
Other work in pipeline failure includes leak detection. Like the data sets used in
this research, leak detection is heavily reliant on time series and rates-of-change in
various signals. Because a leak has serious detrimental effects on both pipeline operations
and the environment, a production pipeline will undergo preventative maintenance
through periodical inspections conducted by maintenance personnel. This requires
intensive human involvement and fails to provide real-time feedback to pipeline
operators. The leak detection methods described in [57] help reduce these periodical
inspections by incorporating hierarchical leak detection and localization through the use
of WSNs. Wan [57] uses the phrase “alerting pipeline operators” and describes false
alarms and the reliability of WSNs in natural gas pipelines. Summarizing recent
advancements of pipeline monitoring and leak detections, [43] provides an excellent
overview of the different types of leak detection systems, including many that involve
temporal-based signal processing. Natural gas pipeline leaks are serious problems to
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encounter. As such, there is an equal concentration on how and where these leaks
originate.
Corrosion causes natural gas pipeline leaks [58]. As described in Section 1.4, raw
natural gas consists of different compounds. There is dry gas, gas that requires little postextraction processing, and there is wet gas, which must be thoroughly processed before
pressurization and injection into the pipe. One of the reasons why wet gas must be
processed significantly more than dry-gas wells is the high level of water, CO2, and H2S
present in the gas. Gas with high levels of water and these dissolved gasses is referred to
as acid gas for its potential to corrode the inside of a pipeline. Several works [58]–[61]
have carried out analysis of pipeline corrosion due to the presence of acid gas to reduce
leakage accidents and pipeline segment weakening. While these works show the problem
of pipeline corrosion is prevalent and makes production companies susceptible to large
economic loss, stopping leaks before they begin has caught the attention of many.
The corrosion of pipelines has led to several works being published aiming to
predict and combat acid gas corrosion. ObaniJesu [62] focuses on the development of a
predictive model for the corrosion rate in natural gas pipelines, specifically with H2S as
the corroding agent in different operating situations. Much like how the alarm forecasting
methods in this thesis need to adapt to different operating situations, [62] models
situations with varying temperature, pressures, and acidity of the gas within the pipe.
Anticipating the other challenges of flowing low-quality gas through the line, [63] ties in
gas hydrate formation and its contribution to corrosion rate along subsea pipelines.
Failure to detect and correct corrosive gas damage to a pipeline can result in large
scale ruptures or explosions. Bedairi [64] shows how a finite-element method using an

35
elastic-plastic fracture mechanics approach can predict crack-in-corrosion defects, while
also bringing to light the lack of assessment methods or current codes for these largescale incidents. The methods described in each of these works are based in mathematical
foundations and are further discussed in Section 2.5.

2.5

Time Series Analysis and the Natural Gas Industry

Forecasting alarms with machine learning is approached as either a classification
or a regression problem. The output of a classification-based model is binary: An alarm is
either present, or it is not present. A regression-based approach predicts future values
which are compared against rules that define an alarm. The benefit of a regression-based
model is in its output, since it can be used to diagnose the state of the pipeline rather than
just an alarm being imminent. Several models can be trained with multiple time horizons
that give control operators more discretion in avoiding unsafe states or unacceptable gas.
One of the first steps in many data analyses applications is performing regression
analysis [65]. Autoregressive models have gained popularity over the last few decades
due to their simplicity, effectiveness, and practical nature in the time series domain. Such
an analysis can provide useful information about correlation and the directionality of the
data, how to estimate the model coefficients, and determining the validity and usefulness
of the model [66]. The correlation found in data sets indexed by time has led to the
significant development of time series work in industrial production [66]. The temporal
aspects of the data sets used in this work contain valuable information relating to how the
system responds to issues threatening flow assurance. Hence, much work has been put
into the fitting and analysis of time series models.
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Development of such work is seen in [67] and [68] when the fitting of time series
models and autocorrelation analysis was published in the 1960s. The inspiration behind
these works and many others was to find efficient ways for parameter estimation while
working with data serial dependence. Due to the nature of time data points, it is
understandable that one observation is often statistically dependent on another
observation recorded at a different time [65]. This property of time series data violates
one of the fundamental assumptions of statistical modeling that the data must be
statistically independent. Work such as [69] show how to test and avoid the misleading
results that can arise from serial dependence in time series forecasting. If the proper steps
are taken, there are many examples of successful regression-based time series models.
Linear regression has been proven successful in the energy production industry.
Thus, it is the first method explored in this work (Section 4.4). In a similar application to
forecasting alarms in natural gas pipelines, Vitullo [70] demonstrates the use of time
series to forecast the amount of gas local utilities need to flow to satisfy hourly and daily
demand. Similar papers [71] and [72] also provide examples of successful forecasting in
the natural gas industry through the use of historical demand and consumption of natural
gas. Often, univariate time series forecasting models are augmented by including other
data sets measuring similar qualities.
The autoregressive models with exogenous variables (ARX) presented in Section
4.5 exploit relationships one signal has with others. It can be very beneficial to consider a
group of time series variables as opposed to concentrating on one single series, thus
making the model more dynamic and sensitive to changes elsewhere in the system. Spliid
[73] lays out how large multivariate time series can be used with distributed lags for fast
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estimation forecasting models. Akouemo [74] applies this idea to the natural gas industry
and incorporates the important idea of how an ARX anomaly detection can be used to
detect and impute anomalous data.
Time series analysis has attracted much attention. To determine some of the most
accurate methods, competitions such as the M-Competitions [75] are designed to test
extrapolation methods in a variety of scenarios and areas of research. Using three
thousand time series, the M-3 competition [76] tested each model entered using realworld objectives with the aim to help forecasters make business decisions. The winner of
the M-3 competition was the Theta method [77], the third forecasting method used in this
work. Out of the 24 methods submitted in this competition, the Theta method performed
the best based on empirical and efficiency-benchmarking assessments.
The Theta method is a specific decomposition technique that uses the projection
and combination of individual components [77]. Otherwise known as simple exponential
smoothing with drift, as proved in [78], the decomposition of both long-term and shortterm components are extracted from the data and are referred to as the ‘theta lines.’ The
long-term trend component is the first theta line, which removes the curvature of the time
series so that it can be a good estimator for long-term behavior of the series. The shortterm trend component of the data doubles the curvatures of the series to gain better
approximations of the short-term behavior. Then, components are combined with
optimized weightings to produce a forecast value of the original series. Time series work
has been continued with the Theta method and has found success in non-competition
work such as [79]. More in-depth analysis has been carried out [80] to optimize
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univariate and multivariate time series forecasting to better fit each application of this
method in specific business settings.
The last method described in Chapter 4 is an artificial neural network (ANN)
forecasting model. Al-Fattah [81] points out the advantages of ANN models in time
series forecasting. In some applications, they outperform traditional time series models.
Al-Fattah [82] shows how to predict natural gas production in the U.S. using an ANN
similar to the network described in 0. While introducing their technique, [82] describes
how the nonlinearity of ANN transfer functions introduces advantages in time series
forecasting compared to conventional regression techniques. Nonlinear ANNs have
proven successful as huge collections of data have become available over the last few
years [47]. These data-driven, self-adaptive models work well with the natural gas
production industry’s large datasets, and success has been found using dimension
reduction techniques seen in [83] to identify production variables that have direct flow
assurance implications.
Chapter 2 has described the balance needed in the natural gas production industry
between increasing output and maintaining flow assurance. The combination of the above
works reflects the inspiration of the research completed in this thesis. A creative aspect of
each work is how the author applies the data available to them to best achieve their
objective. Without data, these methods would not exist and the internal workings of
production pipelines would be less well understood. Chapter 3 presents and analyzes the
data use in this thesis to forecast alarms in natural gas pipelines.
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CHAPTER 3
Introduction to Signal Data and Alarm Thresholds

3.1

Chapter Objectives

This chapter introduces the gas quality signals used in this project. For each
signal, we define alarm thresholds and discuss the behavior of the signal. Then, we
explain the data cleaning process and the tools used to conduct this research.

3.2

Natural Gas Signals and Alarm Thresholds

Tens of sensors are within the pipeline providing a constant flow of information
to the pipeline operators in the control room. Each sensor measures a pipeline condition,
such as gas composition (Table 1.1), internal pressure, flow, etc. These sensors allow
operators to monitor changes within the system, determine processing machinery health,
and assist the pipeline controllers with the transportation of large amounts of natural gas
safely through the pipeline. This section specifies which sensor signals are used to
forecast alarms.
While there are many sensors concurrently collecting and sending information to
the control room, only a few are used to forecast alarms. The signals chosen in this work
are the ones that have the greatest impact on flow assurance. The pipeline conditions
these signals measure are deciding factors of whether the pipeline operates as normal or
gets shut in. For example, controllers have less interest in trace amounts of rare gases
than the internal pressure of the pipe. The production company has provided five signals
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that they regard as most important to ensure flow assurance: pressure (psi), heat content
(BTU), hydrogen sulfide (H2S), carbon dioxide (CO2), and moisture (H2O).
All five pipeline signals are recorded at five locations along the pipeline. Four sets of
the signals are generated at each central processing facility (CPF), while the last set is
from the distribution point. The set of signals being generated at the distribution point is
the target data to be forecast. The distribution point signals are used by the sales point
operators (different from the production pipeline operators) to determine if the gas
flowing into the sales point is of an acceptable quality. [5] provides a general overview of
acceptable quality gas. This work uses more stringent characterizations in the form of
alarm thresholds to define what is acceptable.

Figure 3.1: Alarm thresholds for a generic time series
Alarm thresholds can be thought of as gas quality limits. If a sensor measurement
of a pipeline condition exceeds or falls below an alarm threshold, an alarm may be
imminent, and the pipeline may get shut in. The production company defined four types
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of alarms — high-high, high, low, and low-low. Figure 3.1 shows the generic four alarm
thresholds.
The high-high alarm signifies an extreme system lapse, and the pipeline is either
already shut in or close to it. If a high-high alarm is triggered, the main concern of the
pipeline controller is to protect the production equipment from damage, and to reduce the
amount of line pack building at the distribution point. The next alarm threshold is a high
alarm. Lower that a high-high alarm, high alarms indicate a serious problem is forming in
the system, and action is needed to correct the trajectory of the signal. Conversely, a low
alarm indicates that the signal is falling beneath the acceptable level. A low-low alarm
alerts controllers of a potential equipment failure or a shut-in worthy problem in the
system. Tables 3.1 - 3.5 present each target signal along with its corresponding alarm
thresholds.

3.3

Pressure Signal (psi)

Pressure is what moves gas through the pipe, with the gas flowing from high
pressure to low pressure [6], [25]. This is a fundamental principle of a natural gas
production pipeline and is the main tool used by the pipeline controllers to control the
natural gas delivery system [84]. By closely regulating the pressure, the controllers
manage how much gas is in the system, how fast it is moving, and coordinate the
production of several wells at once. Pressure is a measure of the pounds per square inch
(psi) within the pipe and has been deemed the most important condition in the system by
the production company involved with this project. Excessive pressure is the most
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common reason for the pipeline being shut in. Figure 3.2 shows the pressure time series
for the distribution point fluctuating between 950 psi and 1250 psi.

Figure 3.2: Pressure time series recorded at the distribution point from January 2018 –
May 2018
The exact thresholds for the pressure time series and their occurrences within our
data are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Pressure alarm thresholds and their observed occurrences and frequency
percentage (N = 210,000)

High-high
High
Low
Low-low

Threshold
> 1200
> 1185
< 1070
< 1055

PSI
Occurrences
294
2458
3171
1730

Frequency (%)
0.14
1.20
1.55
0.85

Table 3.1 shows the overall frequency of triggered alarms is quite low. We
expand upon this effect in Chapters 4 and 5 when choosing model structures and error
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metrics. The next signal discussed, measuring the gas heat content (BTU), shows a
similar number of alarms triggered.

3.4

Heat Content Signal (BTU)

The term “heat content” is used in the production industry to help characterize the
quality of natural gas. When the gas is sold at the distribution point, its heating value is a
main determinant of its sales price. Gas with a lower heating value is not as valuable as a
gas with a higher value [85]. This heating value variable depends on the gas consistency
and how much energy is released when the gas is burned [40]. It is measured in British
Thermal Units (BTU) (the amount of energy needed to increase the temperature of one
pound of water by a one degree Fahrenheit [17]). These qualities are important to both
the production company and the distributor, as a contractual agreement holds the
production company responsible to deliver gas that meets the standards of the distributor.
Figure 3.3 shows the heating value signal recorded at the distribution inlet varying
between 1000 BTU to 1160 BTU.
Figure 3.3 shows that most of late March is operating under a low alarm. The
pipeline operators confirmed this irregularity is authentic and not anomalous data.
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Figure 3.3: Heat content (BTU) time series signal recorded at the distribution point from
January 2018 to April 2019
Table 3.2 shows that the number of low alarms is higher than the number of other
alarms during this time.
Table 3.2: BTU alarm thresholds and their observed occurrences and frequency
percentages (N = 523,600)

High-high
High
Low
Low-low

BTU
Threshold Occurrences
> 1115
1309
> 1105
1966
< 1045
6980
< 1035
1419

Frequency (%)
0.25
0.37
1.31
0.27

Pressure and BTU are the first signals identified due to their importance. While all
signals in this work are being monitored constantly in the pipeline control room, the
pipeline operators identified Pressure and BTU signals to have triggered the highest
number of alarms in recent production. However, looking beyond recent production, the
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next signal examined is the sulfur content of the gas, which represents an extreme threat
to the pipeline’s long-term structural health if not closely regulated.

3.5

Hydrogen Sulfide Signal (H2S)

The sulfur content, or the amount of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) present in gas, is one
of the two components that determines if gas is “sweet” or “sour.” Sweeter gas contains a
lower sulfur content and less carbon dioxide, while sour gas contains an unacceptable
amount of these gases. H2S is a carefully monitored quality, as sour gas is not accepted at
the sales points due to its corrosive nature and potential to damage the pipeline [6].
Sulfur stress cracking has been an issue within the production industry, and considerable
research has led to new methods for sweetening of sour natural gas [86]. In this work, gas
is labeled sour when the H2S sensors read values greater than 3 parts-per-million (ppm).

Figure 3.4: Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) time series signal recorded at the distribution point
from May 2018 to April 2019
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Figure 3.4 displays the H2S signal, showing that the controllers of the pipeline do
a relatively good job maintaining the level of H2S under 3ppm. The exact thresholds for
the H2S time series and their occurrences within our data are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: H2S alarm thresholds and their observed occurrences and frequency
percentage (N = 388,880)

High-high
High
Low
Low-low

Threshold
> 2.75
> 2.50
< 0.35
< 0.10

H2 S
Occurrences
700
3660
13209
7251

Frequency (%)
0.18
0.92
3.31
1.82

Both Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show the low and low-low alarm being triggered
more often than any high-alarm. This was interesting to us, as having very little hydrogen
sulfide in the gas stream indicates very lean, high-quality gas. The need for any low
alarms seemed unnecessary, yet the pipeline controllers told us that the low alarms can
help manage machinery at the CPF. If a gas stream at a CPF is registering almost zero
sulfur content, the pipeline controllers use that information to check on the equipment
and possibly reduce the revolutions per minute of the gas sweetening machinery to
prevent unnecessary wear. A similar situation can be seen when monitoring the carbon
dioxide signal.

3.6

Carbon Dioxide Signal (CO2)

Carbon dioxide is the second component of sour gas. CO2-rich gas is not corrosive
and has little to do with flow assurance on its own. However, when combined with
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hydrogen sulfide, acid gas forms which leads to critical problems for production pipelines
(Section 2.3). If the pipeline were to get shut-in, flaring any amount of acid gas from the
system must be avoided due to the amount of greenhouse gas released. This usually
forces production to halt until the gas can either be diffused with sweet gas or back-flown
for reinjection into the ground. Figure 3.5 shows the levels of CO2 from May 2018 to
April 2019 fluctuating between 0.25 and 1.75 parts-per-million.

Figure 3.5: Carbon dioxide (CO2) time series signal recorded at the distribution point from
May 2018 to April 2019
The exact thresholds for the CO2 time series and their occurrences within our data
are summarized in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: CO2 alarm thresholds and their observed occurrences and frequency
percentage (N = 530,842)

High-high
High
Low
Low-low

Threshold
> 1.75
> 1.50
< 0.50
< 0.25

CO2
Occurrences
15129
24829
6516
679

Frequency (%)
2.85
4.67
1.23
0.13

Figure 3.5 shows the carbon dioxide signal triggering high alarms in late March.
This correlates with the BTU signal triggering low alarms in late March and is a result of
the production pipeline producing higher quality gas during that time. Table 3.4 shows
the H2S alarm thresholds and their frequency of being triggered. Similar to how the H2S
signal triggers low alarms, the low alarms for CO2 do not indicate a failure; rather they
relay information back to the pipeline controllers that they use for adjusting the system.

3.7

Water Content Signal (H2O)

The moisture content is measured in pounds of water per million standard cubic
feet of gas [6]. Figure 3.6 shows the water content measured at the distribution point.
Water or water vapor (H2O) is almost always present in raw natural gas, ranging from
trace amounts to saturation [5]. In this production operation, gas is dehydrated as it is
pulled from the wellhead to the processing plant via refrigeration units.
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Figure 3.6: Water content (H2O) time series signal recorded at the distribution point
from May 2018 to April 2019
The exact thresholds for the H2O time series and their occurrences within our data
are summarized in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: H2O alarm thresholds and their observed occurrences and frequency
percentage (N = 533,026)

High-high
High
Low
Low-low

H2 O
Threshold Occurrences
> 6.5
8102
> 5.0
14809
< 1.2
1058
< 1.0
87

Frequency (%)
1.52
2.78
0.20
0.02

The number of low and low-low alarms shown in Table 3.5 are the fewest of all the
signals, with low-low alarms being triggered only 0.02 percent of the time. This fact was
discussed with the pipeline controllers, who decided to keep the low alarm thresholds asis but declared the lower H2O alarms generally less important than the other signals
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discussed. The effect of this decision is discussed in the Chapter 5 when considering the
performance metrics used to evaluate the H2O forecast models.

3.8

Preparation of Raw Time Series Data

This section describes the cleaning process carried out on the time series signals
presented in Sections 3.3-3.7. The process begins with the initial retrieval of the data in
raw form and ends with the cleaned time series used to train the alarm forecasting
models. The following section begins with a brief overview of the data conversion from
comma separated value (csv) files to MATLAB time series. Then, the cleaning of those
time series objects leads to a discussion of non-uniform time series and linear modeling.
Finally, the anomaly detection and imputation method is examined.
The production company supplies the data used in the project via csv files, with
each file containing the historical signals generated from central processing facilities
located along the pipeline. As in many cases when using signal data collected in the field,
there are many ‘NULL’ entries in each file, either from communication failure between
the pipeline sensors and the control room or temporary equipment failure. Unix scripts
are used to located and delete any ‘NULL’ time-value pairs. After each signal is
separated into its respective csv file, the ‘time’ column vector of each csv is converted
from a Microsoft Excel timestamp to a character vector in preparation to turn the csv
signals into MATLAB time series objects.
The csv files are read into MATLAB and stored as .mat files. In most time series
models, the sampling rate or interval at which observations are recorded is vital
information when processing raw data [66]. The time series and signal processing
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algorithms described in Chapter 4 require a signal with a consistent sample rate. The
signals received by the production company are asynchronous [87], meaning that there is
no uniform amount of time between each sensor reading. Each signal must be converted
to be uniformly sampled while also maintaining the natural behavior of the data. Each gas
quality behaves differently in the pipeline, so a consistent sample rate must be chosen for
all five time series such that the natural behaviors of each signal remain present in the
interpolation.
The non-uniformly sampled pipeline signals are received in the control room and
presented to the operators via a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system. The SCADA system provides our algorithms the data needed to make real-time
forecasts, so the sampling rate matters. The production company’s SCADA system
samples on average every nine seconds; however, the SCADA sample rates can range
from 5 to 200 seconds, as shown in Figure 3.7.

Figure 3.7: Histogram of sampling intervals of the distribution point’s pressure signal
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Figure 3.7 shows the most frequent sampling rate is 9 seconds. The pipeline
controllers determined that a consistent ten-second sampling rate would maintain the
integrity of the data and that the SCADA system would be able to provide consistent
observations to the alarm forecasting algorithms using a sample-and-hold approach. This
allows us to resample the time series objects using ten-second intervals with built-in
MATLAB R2019b resample functions [88] and produce a uniform time series. Then we
begin the process of detecting and correcting possible inaccurate observations with our
time series anomaly detection and imputation algorithm.

3.9

Time Series Cleaning — Anomaly Detection and Imputation

Anomalous data degrades our alarm forecasting model parameters and real-time
forecasts. To avoid anomalous data being used in our parameter estimation and
forecasting, we implement an anomaly detection and imputation technique. This section
defines what an anomalous observation is and how we differentiate between real and
erroneous signal observations.
In many real-time monitoring tasks, it is vital to have accurate machinery and
skilled workers to identify abnormal behavior quickly. In this setting, we have the sensors
within the natural gas production pipeline and the pipeline controllers monitoring the
SCADA system. The controllers interpret the data produced from the sensors to
determine the state of the system. If an unusual event is occurring, the controllers are the
first to identify and categorize what is happening. For example, if pipeline maintenance
requires the internal pressure of the pipe to be lowered for a few hours, alarms are
triggered, but no action is taken because the controllers are aware of the necessary
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maintenance. Such human-interactive events create data that does not represent the usual
day-to-day signals needed to train the forecasting model parameters and ultimately
degrades our forecasting models. Conversely, if a naturally occurring event appears in the
data, it is crucial to include that event in the training data so that we can forecast the
correct alarms for that situation.
Knowing the difference between naturally occurring events and anomalous data
falls into domain knowledge that the production controllers possess. Figure 3.8 shows
examples of anomalous observations (circled in red) found within the raw time series
signal. The anomaly detection and imputation considers the domain knowledge of the
pipeline controllers and statistical likelihoods of each point being a natural observation or
an error.

Figure 3.8: Pressure time series with confirmed anomalies circled in red
The anomaly detection and imputation algorithm used in this work is based on
[74] by Akouemo, who applied this technique to the similar problem of natural gas
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energy forecasting. The converted algorithm used in this work stems from her
hypothesis-driven outlier detection method but has been modified to fit the problem of
this research.
There are two areas in which anomaly detection is used. The first is to determine
whether the training data is legitimate when estimating the model coefficients. If a model
is trained using anomalous signals, the model may produce erroneous forecasts. This is
especially true when applying the model to out-of-sample signals, which is the main
intent of the production company controllers.
The second application of anomaly detection is operation of our forecasting
algorithm in real-time. As the SCADA system receives new data, it is possible that some
observations are anomalous. To detect these occurrences, the anomaly detection
algorithm is fed the most recent observation and uses a Bayesian maximum likelihood
classifier [66] to label it anomalous or not. If identified as anomalous, the data point is
replaced with model estimates.
Chapter 3 introduced the gas quality signals used in this project to forecast
pipeline alarm. For each signal, we present alarm thresholds and explain the signal’s
behavior. The data cleaning process is described to give an idea of the issues in our
datasets, which leads to the anomaly detection and imputation algorithm discussion.
Once the data has been cleaned and parsed, it is possible to forecast each signal using the
methods presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
Forecasting Methods and Framework
4.1

Chapter Objectives

This chapter begins by providing a description of the alarm forecasting
framework used in this work. We then define the training and testing data sets and a
baseline model to help evaluate each forecasting method. The first method implements a
10th-order autoregressive model. The second method is an extension of the first
autoregressive model but incorporates exogenous variables from different central
processing facilities (CPF). Then, the Theta method is examined, where simple
exponential smoothing with drift is applied to the data sets. Finally, an artificial neural
network is used to forecast pipeline signals.

4.2

Framework for Real-Time Alarm Forecasting

This section introduces the notation used in this chapter and describes the
framework for real-time alarm forecasting. A time series is a set of data ordered in time
[66]. In this work, a distribution point signal, 𝑌, is
𝑌 = { 𝑦(𝑡), 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑁}.
In this form, 𝑦(𝑡) is the value of the distribution point signal 𝑦 at time 𝑡. Time 𝑡 is
uniformly spaced at 10-second intervals (Section 3.8), and the values of 𝑦(𝑡) have been
tested for anomalies (Section 3.9). The signals at the distribution point are differentiated
with signal type subscripts. Thus, 𝑌𝑝𝑠𝑖 , 𝑌𝐵𝑡𝑢 , 𝑌𝐻2 𝑠 , 𝑌𝐶𝑂2 , and 𝑌𝐻2 𝑂 are the signals for
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pressure, heat content, hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, and moisture content,
respectively.
The notation used to describe the alarm forecasting algorithms is shown in Figure
4.1.

Figure 4.1: Notations of each central processing facility data set showing how each well
is referenced in the alarm forecasting equations
The gas received at the distribution point is a function of the signals from the CPFs,
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑋3 , 𝑋4 ),

(4.1)

where 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑋3 , and 𝑋4 are the exogenous signals from 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹2, 𝐶𝑃𝐹3 , and 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 ,
respectively. Similar to the notation used for the signal 𝑌 from the distribution point, 𝑋 is
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subscripted to indicate the CPF from which it came and the type of signal. For example,
𝑋2,𝐵𝑡𝑢 is the BTU signal from 𝐶𝑃𝐹2 .
The target signal produced at the distribution point 𝑌 is modeled as lagged
versions of the signals from the CPFs. Let 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 , 𝑙3 , and 𝑙4 be the time it takes the natural
gas to flow from 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹2 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹3 , and 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 to the distribution point, respectively.
Equation 4.2 is the model currently used by the control room operators to combine the
lagged signals from the CPFs to predict the distribution point signal. Let 𝑤𝑖 represent
weights for each exogenous signal.
𝑦̂(𝑡) = 𝑤1 𝑥1 (𝑡 − 𝑙1 ) + 𝑤2 𝑥2 (𝑡 − 𝑙2 )
+ 𝑤3 𝑥2 (𝑡 − 𝑙3 ) + 𝑤4 𝑥4 (𝑡 − 𝑙4 ),

(4.2)

where 𝑡 > max (𝑙1 , 𝑙2 , 𝑙3 , 𝑙4 ).
Our algorithm forecasts pipeline signals 1 to 30 minutes into the future. After
each forecast is made, the 30 estimates are compared against the alarm thresholds (Figure
3.1) for the predicted gas quality. If any of the forecasts cross the low, low-low, high, or
high-high thresholds, an alarm is raised for that time horizon. It is possible to have
several alarms in different signals being triggered at once. The term time horizon,
represented with ℎ, is used to indicate which of the 30 forecasted time horizons is
triggering an alarm. Forecasted distribution point values ℎ minutes into the future are
denoted by 𝑦̂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 (𝑡 + ℎ). For example, the H2O signal at the distribution point
forecasted 10 minutes into the future is 𝑦̂𝐻2 𝑂 (𝑡 + 10).
The methods below are tools for the pipeline operator and have been developed
with their requests in mind. Each method is implemented in an algorithm that fires every
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ten seconds to display the alarm forecasts to the pipeline operators via the SCADA
system. Algorithm 4.1 shows the general algorithm for each forecasting technique as it
operates on one signal.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Receive new time series values from SCADA system every ten seconds
Conduct anomaly detection; Impute if necessary
Enter new data with old data into forecaster
Compare forecasts against alarm thresholds:
If(forecast
If(forecast
If(forecast
If(forecast

≥
≥
≤
≤

High-high alarm threshold) : Trigger high-high alarm
High alarm threshold) : Trigger high alarm
Low alarm threshold) : Trigger low alarm
Low-low alarm threshold) : Trigger low-low alarm

5. Alert if necessary

Algorithm 4.1 — The alarm prediction algorithm in the SCADA system.
Algorithm 4.1 triggers a single alarm at once. A high-high alarm takes precedence
over a high alarm, and a low-low alarm over a low alarm.
Now that the time series used in this work are defined, we split them into training
and testing data sets.

4.3

Testing Data and the Naïve Model

A 70/30 percent split of each signal is used for training and testing the four
forecasting methods explained below. Throughout the training and testing sets, the low
frequency of triggered alarms creates an issue discussed in Chapter 6’s summary. In
addition to the error metrics calculated for each model, a performance measurement
known as the naïve model is implemented as a basis for comparison.
Equation 4.2 is an example of a simplistic model that is used to forecast signal
data. Our first objective with each forecasting model is to outperform a basic, effective
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model. Hence, a naïve model is used as a basis for comparison. The naïve model for a
general distribution point signal 𝑦 at time horizon ℎ is
𝑦̂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 (𝑡 + ℎ) = 𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 (𝑡).

(4.3)

The naïve model simply uses whatever the signal’s current value is at time 𝑡 to be the
forecasted value at 𝑡 + ℎ [66].
This elementary forecasting technique is used for two reasons. First, is it is similar
to how the control room operators manage the pipeline without the alarm forecasting
algorithms. The easiest way to get an idea of the future is to consider the present, so
control room operators use the most recent information available to make decisions.
Second, despite the naïve model’s simplicity, it is accurate enough to be used as a basis
for comparison. If any of the models presented below cannot outperform the naïve model,
it is considered unacceptable. This is first tested with the 10th-order autoregressive model.

4.4

10th-order Autoregressive Model (AR(10))

One of the first steps in many data analysis applications is performing regression
analysis [65]. In time series applications, it is common to see autoregressive terms used in
forecasting (Section 2.5). Let 𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑛) represent a lagged value from the distribution
point series 𝑦, and let 𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ) be the forecasted value. A general autoregressive model
is a function of values at previous time steps.
𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ) = F(𝑦(𝑡 − 1), 𝑦(𝑡 − 2), … , 𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑝)),

(4.4)

where 𝑝 is the number of lagged values. The value 𝑦(𝑡 − 1) is the signal value recorded
one minute in the past.
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The autoregressive model predicts future distribution point values, 𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ),
using the past ten minute’s worth of signal data in 𝑦 and weights 𝛽⃗ . The order-𝑃 equation
is
𝑃

𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ) = ∑( 𝛽𝑚 𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑝)) + 𝛽0 .

(4.5)

𝑝=1

The equation’s order, 𝑃, is 10.
The weights, 𝛽⃗ , used in Equation (4.5) are found using least squares [67],
minimizing the mean square of residuals
𝑛

1
∑(𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑦̂(𝑡))2
𝑛

(4.6)

𝑖=1

with respect to {𝛽𝑚 ; 𝑚 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑀} in Equation (4.6). A 10th-order AR model is trained
for each time horizon, resulting in 30 models. Next, we incorporate exogenous variables.

4.5

10th-order Autoregressive Model with Exogenous Variables (ARX)

The next logical approach to modeling this system is to incorporate exogenous
variables into the forecasting method. In this case, the exogenous variables are the lagged
signals of the central processing facilities (CPF). Because each signal holds important
historical information, autoregressive terms are incorporated for each exogenous signal.
This combination of autoregressive terms and exogenous variables (ARX) form the
second forecasting method.
Referencing Figure 4.1, let 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑋3 , and 𝑋4 be the signals of 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹2 ,
𝐶𝑃𝐹3 , and 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 . Let 𝑙1 , 𝑙2 , 𝑙3 , and 𝑙4 be the time it takes the natural gas to flow from
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𝐶𝑃𝐹1 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹2 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹3 , and 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 to the distribution point, respectively. Let the weight matrix
𝛽 be size five by ten, with the first row holding the weights for the autoregressive terms
and the remaining rows the lagged exogenous signals. The autoregressive model with
exogenous variables is
𝑀

𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ) = ∑ (𝛽1,𝑚 𝑦(𝑡 − 𝑚)
𝑚=1

+ (𝛽2,𝑚 𝑥1 (𝑡 − 𝑙1 − 𝑚)
+ (𝛽3,𝑚 𝑥2 (𝑡 − 𝑙2 − 𝑚)

(4.7)

+ (𝛽4,𝑚 𝑥3 (𝑡 − 𝑙3 − 𝑚)
+ (𝛽5,𝑚 𝑥4 (𝑡 − 𝑙4 − 𝑚).
Lags 𝑙1 , … , 𝑙4 are found by comparing a lagged cross-correlation between each signal
coming from 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 and the signal at the distribution point. Figures 4.3 and 4.4
show an example of a lagged signal.
Figure 4.2 depicts a lag in the H2O signal data from 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 (blue line) to the
distribution point (black line). The red line is used to help show that when the 𝑋1 H2O
signal increases, a similar increase is seen in the distribution point’s signal 𝑙1 minutes
later.
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Figure 4.2: Visualizing a lag between 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 and the distribution point’s 𝐻2 𝑂 signals

Figure 4.3: Lagged cross-correlation between 𝑋1𝐻2𝑂 and 𝑌𝐻2𝑂
Figure 4.3 shows the lagged cross-correlation plot between X1H2O and YH2O . We
choose lag 𝑙1 to be the minute with the highest correlation, which is seen at 97 minutes in
this example. Table 4.1 summarizes the time it takes for gas entering the pipe at any CPF
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to reach the distribution point. The 𝑙𝑖 ’s in Equation (4.7) are found under the column
‘Lag Time to Distribution’ measured in minutes for each respective gas quality.
Weight matrix 𝛽5,10 is structured so that each row of 1x10 weights are used in a
linear combination of the 10 lagged values of each CPF time series. The first column
vector 𝛽:,1 consists of a bias vector of 1’s to consider the intercept of each series.

𝛽5,10

1 𝛽1,2
⋮
= [⋮
1 𝛽5,2

⋯ 𝛽1,10
⋱ ⋮ ]
⋯ 𝛽5,10

} Weights used with series 𝑌
⋮
} Weights used with series 𝑋4 .

(4.8)

Equation 4.9 illustrates how to calculate the forecasted BTU at the distribution
point by putting together all the notation defined in this section.
𝑀

𝑦̂𝐵𝑡𝑢 (𝑡 + ℎ) = ∑ (𝛽1,𝑚 𝑦𝐵𝑡𝑢 (𝑡 − 𝑚)
𝑚=1

+ (𝛽2,𝑚 𝑥1 𝐵𝑡𝑢 (𝑡 − 𝑙1 − 𝑚)
+ (𝛽3,𝑚 𝑥2𝐵𝑡𝑢 (𝑡 − 𝑙2 − 𝑚)

(4.9)

+ (𝛽4,𝑚 𝑥3𝐵𝑡𝑢 (𝑡 − 𝑙3 − 𝑚)
+ (𝛽5,𝑚 𝑥4𝐵𝑡𝑢 (𝑡 − 𝑙4 − 𝑚).
The 𝑙𝑖 ’s are gathered from Table 4.1, which illustrates that the further away the CFP, the
longer the time the gas takes to travel to the distribution point.
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Table 4.1: The amount of time it takes for a signal’s behavior to effect the signal being
generated at the distribution sales point

CPF

Average Lag Time to
Distribution
(𝑳𝒊 - minutes)

Average Calculated
Correlation

𝑋1

92

0.78

𝑋2

105

0.62

𝑋3

173

0.41

𝑋4

209

0.26

The next forecasting method does not use any autoregressive terms as inputs.
Instead, the Theta method considers recent trends in the signal data to make forecasts.

4.6

Simple Exponential Smoothing with Drift (Theta Method)

The Theta Method [77], otherwise known as simple exponential smoothing with
drift, is used to forecast signals at the distribution point. The unoptimized Theta method
is
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) + 0.5 ∗ 𝐿2
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ)
𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ) = 0.5 ∗ 𝐿0

(4.10)

where 𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ) is the forecasted distribution sales point series value h time steps ahead of
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) represents a forecasted long-term component extracted from the
current time t. 𝐿0
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) is the forecasted short-term
data h time steps ahead of current time t, and 𝐿2
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component extracted from the data h time steps ahead of current time t. Forecasting is
carried out by an equal weighted combination of these two components.
𝐿0(𝑡), the first Theta line, is calculated with the linear trend estimates 𝑏𝑜 and 𝑏1 ,
𝐿0(𝑡) = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑏1 (𝑡).

(4.11)

Once completed, the second Theta line is found using 𝐿0(𝑡) in Equation (4.12).
𝐿2(𝑡) = 2 ∗ 𝑦(𝑡) ∗ 𝐿0(𝑡).

(4.12)

̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) and 𝐿2
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) are calculated to get the
With both Theta lines defined, 𝐿0
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) is found in the same way as 𝐿0(𝑡) with the exception
final forecast 𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ). 𝐿0
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) is forecasting h steps ahead.
that 𝐿0
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) = 𝑏𝑜 + 𝑏1 (𝑡 + ℎ).
𝐿0

(4.13)

̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) is forecasted using simple exponential smoothing and incorporates an
𝐿2
optimized smoothing parameter 𝛼,
̂ (𝑡 + ℎ) = 𝛼(𝐿2(𝑡)) + (1 − 𝛼)𝐿2
̂ (𝑡) .
𝐿2

(4.14)

The Theta method, 10th-order autoregressive model, and 10th-order autoregressive
model with exogenous variables are linear models used to forecast the different signals at
the distribution point. The next method, an artificial neural network, introduces a
nonlinear aspect to this work.

4.7

Artificial Neural Network

An artificial neural network (ANN) is applied to this work in a manner similar to
past applications seen in the energy industry (Section 2.4). We use a one hidden-layer,
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five-node ANN in this work, as suggested in Figure 4.5. The hidden layer neurons are
sigmoid. The output layer has a linear transfer function.

Figure 4.4: ANN feed forward architecture with one hidden layers and 40 nodes
The term neuron follows the traditional naming convention of ANN’s and
represents the interconnected processing elements grouped in layers. The ANN uses the
same inputs as the ARX model, with each input node being ten minutes of lagged signal
data from the distribution point, 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹2 , 𝐶𝑃𝐹3 , and 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 . The ANN outputs a single
node, 𝑦̂(𝑡 + ℎ), which is the forecasted value at the current time plus the time horizon,
𝑡 + ℎ.
Following a feed-forward architecture, each minute’s input is modified and
summed in the hidden layer. The hidden layer in the ANN consists of a sigmoid transfer
function,

sigmoid(𝑥) =

1
.
1 + 𝑒 −𝑥

(4.15)
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The sigmoid transfer function takes the values provided by the input nodes and produces
a scalar that is combined with weights 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 . These combinations are summed, and
appropriate bias values, 𝑏, are applied. The output layer consists of a linear activation
function
linear(𝑥) = 𝑥.

(4.16)

The linear activation function, as in the regression-based models, transforms the
weighted observations from the hidden layer to obtain a continuous output that represents
the forecasted signal value. Finally, we use a Levenberg-Marquardt (LM) training
algorithm to train the ANN [89]. The LM algorithm iteratively optimizes the network
weights and bias values using a sum of squares error loss function (Equation 4.6).
Chapter 4 presents the forecasting framework and models used in this work. The
forecasting framework is developed to be compatible with the existing SCADA
infrastructure, easily expandable, and require little computational resources to operate.
The 10th-order autoregressive, autoregressive with exogenous variables, Theta method,
and artificial neural network makes forecasts 1 to 30 minutes into the future. With the
forecasting methods defined, Chapter 5 presents an empirical analysis to determine the
forecasting model that best fits the need of the production company.
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CHAPTER 5
Empirical Results and Discussion

5.1

Chapter Objectives

Chapter 5 presents discussion, interpretation, and comparison of the experimental
results. We present the error metrics used to determine each model’s accuracy along with
explanations of why each metric is relevant and an appropriate choice. We compare the
forecasting models to the naïve model and state its performance across all time horizons.
Numerical and graphical performance reviews are given to compare each forecasting
model with the others.

5.2

Error Metrics

Each pipeline alarm forecasting algorithm predicts alarms at time horizons 1
through 30 minutes. We predict alarms by forecasting the value of each gas quality and
then detecting if the quality threshold is met by the forecast (Algorithm 4.1). This
threshold check is done for each time horizon. Two measures are used to summarize the
performance of the algorithm: root-mean-square error (RMSE) and mean-absolutepercentage error (MAPE). These error metrics demonstrate the accuracy of the gas
quality forecasts.
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RMSE is a measure of the average residual. Let 𝑦(𝑡) be the value of signal 𝑦 at
time t, 𝑦̂(𝑡) be the predicted quality at time t, and T be the total number of forecasts. The
RMSE is

RMSE = √

∑𝑇
̂(𝑡) −𝑦(𝑡) )2
𝑖=1(𝑦
𝑇

.

(5.1)

The RMSE is a good measure of error but can be overly influenced by outliers.
RMSE is measured in the units of signal 𝑦.
We also present the MAPE, which measures the average absolute error. It is
unitless and represents the percent of error.
𝑇

|(𝑦̂(𝑡) − 𝑦(𝑡))|
1
MAPE = ∑
.
𝑇
𝑦(𝑡)

(5.2)

𝑖=1

RMSE and MAPE are based on the continuous output of each model, meaning they do
not represent how well each model forecasts alarms. To measure binary presence of an
alarm, we use sensitivity as a metric. The sensitivity is a measure of how many alarms are
correctly predicted out of all possible alarms. Let TP (true-positive) be the number of
alarms that are correctly predicted, and FN (false-negative) be the number missed alarms.
Sensitivity is then found with equation 5.3.

Sensitivity =

𝑇𝑃
,
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(5.3)

We present the sensitivity because the number of non-alarms is far greater than the
number of alarms. Summarizing Tables 3.1 – 3.5, the average of each alarm considering
each signal is presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: General frequencies of all alarms considering all time series signals

Alarm Frequency (%)
Alarm

PSI

BTU

H2S

CO2

H20

Avg. Alarm Frequency (%)

High-high

0.14

0.25

0.18

2.85

1.52

0.988

High

1.2

0.37

0.92

4.67

2.78

1.988

Low

1.55

1.31

3.31

1.23

0.2

1.52

Low-low

0.85

0.27

1.82

0.13

0.02

0.618

The high alarm is triggered most frequently, but it only occurs approximately 2%
of the time. Since all the methods in this work are based on regression analysis, and that
an alarm is either triggered or not, sensitivity helps us obtain statistical measures of this
binary classification.
The experimental results are shown in two respects. The first considers the
numerical output of each forecasting method in comparison with the true values of the
series (RMSE, MAPE). The second considers the binary classification of the presence of
an alarm (sensitivity). The five natural gas pipeline signals being used in this work are
forecasted 1-30 minutes into the future. We select results from time horizons 1, 15, and
30 minutes to compactly compare the performance of each model. This is shown in
Figure 5.2. The sensitivity of the forecasted alarms is plotted across all 30 time horizons
to show that out of all the alarms that were truly triggered, how many each forecasting
method correctly predicted. To provide the production pipeline operators the most
amount of warning, the 30-minute time horizon is an important upper-bounding case of
the performance of each model.
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5.3

Naïve Model Results

Section 4.2 describes the naïve model and how it is used as a baseline performance
metric. This section displays the naïve model results and acts as an introduction to
understanding the result plots used for each of the forecasting methods (Sections 5.4 –
5.9). We present the MAPE and sensitivity of the naïve model below for the pressure
target data set (the signals recorded at the distribution point). In the empirical results
section (Section 5.4), we see that the naïve model is a comparable alternative to the
purposed forecasting methods.

Figure 5.1: Naïve model MAPE for pressure time series over all time horizons
Figure 5.1 shows the MAPE over each time horizon of the naïve model forecasting
the pressure at distribution point. The naïve model’s MAPE increases almost linearly
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with the time horizon. This is expected since the naïve model simply uses the current
value as the forecasted value at time horizon 30.
The sensitivity plot shows the true-positive rate of the naïve model over time.
Figure 5.2 shows how the naïve model predicts the four pressure alarm thresholds over
all time horizons.

Figure 5.2: Naïve model pressure (psi) sensitivity w.r.t time horizon
The sensitivity shows how many alarms were predicted correctly at each time
horizon where 1 indicates 100%. Here we see the alarm prediction accuracy falls
approximately linearly from near 100% accuracy at 1 minute to 60-95% accuracy at 30
minutes. The naïve model performed the worst for the high-high alarm forecasts, while
the low-low alarms were predicted correctly 95% of the time. When evaluating the five
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sets of models below, only the high alarm sensitivity rate is considered. This is because
the high alarm is the most frequently triggered alarm out of all the datasets (Table 5.1)
and pipeline controllers are generally more concerned with high alarms for each signal
than the low. Higher pressure, H2S, CO2, and H2O contents indicate serious conditions in
the pipeline that require the immediate attention of the controller, while their
corresponding low alarms are not as urgent. We begin the analysis of results below.

5.4

Empirical Results of all Models

This section presents the empirical results of the four model types described in
Chapter 4: 10th-order autoregressive (AR(10)), autoregressive with exogenous variables
(ARX), Theta, and artificial neural network (ANN) forecasting models. Table 5.2
summaries the numerical findings for these models. These results measure the ability of
each model to forecast future signal values and do not represent alarm forecasting
accuracy. For each signal in Table 5.2, the best performing forecasting model is
highlighted in blue.
Two models consistently outperform all others. The ARX and ANN are the best
predictors at time horizon 30. For the pressure signal, the ARX performs best at time
horizon 30, while the ANN forecasts with higher accuracy at the 15-minute mark. For all
other signals, the ANN performs best at time horizon 30.
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Table 5.2: The results of each forecasting method at time horizons 1, 15, and 30 minutes

Model
Naïve
AR
ARX
Theta
ANN

Time Horizon = 1 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.23
0.01
0.19
0.01
0.23
0.01
0.22
0.01
0.19
0.01

Model
Naïve
AR
ARX
Theta
ANN

Time Horizon = 1 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.56
0.01
0.60
0.01
0.48
0.01
0.52
0.01
0.62
0.01

Model
Naïve
AR
ARX
Theta
ANN

Time Horizon = 1 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.04
0.48
0.02
0.48
0.02
0.47
0.02
0.48
0.02
0.47

Model
Naïve
AR
ARX
Theta
ANN

Time Horizon = 1 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.02
0.34
0.01
0.36
0.01
0.40
0.01
0.32
0.01
0.43

Model
Naïve
AR
ARX
Theta
ANN

Time Horizon = 1 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.02
1.03
0.02
0.62
0.02
0.82
0.02
0.95
0.03
1.72

PSI
Time Horizon = 15 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
1.68
0.08
1.07
0.06
0.94
0.05
1.55
0.08
0.83
0.05
BTU
Time Horizon = 15 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
2.77
0.12
2.33
0.09
1.71
0.07
2.57
0.11
3.72
0.05
H2 S
Time Horizon = 15 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.14
5.73
0.09
4.86
0.08
4.20
0.10
5.28
0.03
3.59
CO2
Time Horizon = 15 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.06
3.49
0.05
3.05
0.05
3.37
0.06
3.24
0.02
1.15
H2 O
Time Horizon = 15 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.06
1.95
0.05
1.69
0.06
1.88
0.06
1.82
0.04
2.06

Time Horizon = 30 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
3.06
0.15
2.07
0.11
1.29
0.07
2.82
0.14
1.45
0.08
Time Horizon = 30 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
3.84
0.17
3.21
0.13
2.94
0.10
3.56
0.16
2.62
0.06
Time Horizon = 30 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.14
6.18
0.11
7.01
0.10
5.24
0.12
5.71
0.03
4.02
Time Horizon = 30 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.08
5.08
0.05
4.11
0.06
4.68
0.07
4.71
0.02
1.67
Time Horizon = 30 min.
RMSE
MAPE (%)
0.10
2.87
0.09
2.60
0.09
2.69
0.09
2.67
0.05
2.43
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While the ARX and ANN models are the overall best forecasters at time horizon
30, there are instances where other models are better at shorter time horizons. Sections
5.5-5.10 provide an in-depth analysis of the results for each signal over all time horizons
and compares the forecasters visually.

5.5

Pressure (psi) Signal Alarm Forecasting Results

The control room operators labeled the pressure signal to be the most critical
pipeline variable. We test our pressure forecasting models and compare their
performance. Figure 5.3 shows each mode’s MAPE performance across all time horizons.

Figure 5.3: MAPE of all pressure forecasting models over the 30 time horizons
All pressure models outperform the naïve model as measured by MAPE. In time
horizons 1-15, the simple autoregressive model (AR10), artificial neural network (ANN),
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and autoregressive model with exogenous variables (ARX) do the best short-term
forecasting. In the later time horizons, we see the ARX and ANN models perform the
best. Both these models use inputs from exogenous variables. This confirms that the
lagged pressure signals coming from the upstream central processing facilities (CPF)
have a significant influence on the pressure signals being recorded at the distribution
point. It should also be noted that 𝐶𝑃𝐹2 does not have enough pressure data to be
included as an exogenous variable, so that signal is excluded from training the pressure
models (Equation 4.7). Next, we evaluate each pressure model’s high alarm forecasting
accuracy.

Figure 5.4: High alarm sensitivity of all pressure forecasting models over the 30 time
horizons
A higher sensitivity rate translates to more alarms being predicted correctly. In
Figure 5.4, the ARX model (yellow line) correctly predicts 93.3% of the alarms at time
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horizon 30. Because the pipeline control operators need as much time as possible to react
to a triggered alarm, the farthest time horizon is the most important. The results from
Figure 5.4 indicate that the ARX model is the best overall pressure forecasting model for
time horizons 24-30.
The sensitivity plot contradicts the MAPE results seen in Figure 5.3. The ANN
has the lowest MAPE scores. However, it does poorly when forecasting high alarms
according to the sensitivity plot. The ANN struggles to forecast alarm-triggering pressure
events, but does well when forecasting the steady-state signal (when no alarms are
present). This quality of the ANN is unhelpful to the pipeline controllers and suggests
that the ARX model is the best pressure signal forecaster. Figure 5.4 illustrates an
example where the sensitivity plot provides more useful information than the MAPE plot
when trying to identify appropriate models.
For each signal in this chapter, it is important to consider the frequency of alarm
occurrences per threshold (Table 3.1). The testing dataset for the pressure time series
contained the largest number of high alarms, so the sensitivity rate of the high alarm
threshold is the best threshold to test for the pressure models. In other testing datasets, a
different alarm threshold may be a more logical choice to test. The heat content
forecasting model is an example of this. The low alarm threshold is the most important
for monitoring the gas heat content, but the lack of these alarms in the testing data set
results in the high threshold being used to calculate the model’s sensitivity.
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5.6

Heat Content Signal (BTU) Alarm Forecasting Results

The heat content (BTU) signal also is prioritized by the production company as an
essential signal when maintaining flow assurance. Figure 5.3 shows how each BTU
forecasting model performs at the 30 different forecasting horizons in terms of MAPE.

Figure 5.5: MAPE of all BTU forecasting models over the 30 time horizons
Figure 5.5 shows the ANN and ARX are the two best BTU forecasting models
when considering MAPE. Of the two, the ANN outperforms the ARX over time horizons
2-30. We verify if the ANN remains the best performer when forecasting the high alarms
by examining the sensitivity in Figure 5.6.
Unlike the pressure model ANN, the BTU ANN is a top performer when looking at
the sensitivity of high BTU alarms. Considering the ANN’s MAPE and sensitivity rate,
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the BTU ANN is the best model for forecasting pipeline alarms. The AR model
outperforms the ARX model, which signifies that the exogenous variables for BTU are
not as significant as in the pressure model. The Theta method was one of the worst
performers, only correctly identifying 75% of the high alarms at time horizon 30.

Figure 5.6: High alarm sensitivity of all BTU forecasting models over the 30 time
horizons
For the BTU signal, low alarms are more important to pipeline operators than
high alarms. As opposed to pressure, where a high alarm requires the immediate attention
of the pipeline controllers, high heat content indicates high-quality gas is in the pipe and
does not pose an immediate threat. Yet, a low BTU signal can violate the agreement held
between the production company and buyer, causing the buyer to shut in the pipeline.
Ideally, we want to test the low alarm's sensitivity, but because the testing set does not
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include any low alarms we use the high alarm threshold to evaluate each model’s alarm
sensitivity.
Despite the pressure and BTU signals being identified as the most important
signals by the pipeline controllers, the remaining signals discussed in this chapter still
have the potential to shut in the pipeline. However, the hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide,
and moisture content signals are more easily influenced by human intervention, and our
data cleaning process identified significantly more outliers in these data sets. This is due
to the pipeline operators having more control over the processing equipment that controls
these signals and the general volatility of each signal. Next, we describe the results of
modeling the remaining signals.

5.7

Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) Signal Alarm Forecasting Results

Figure 5.7 shows the MAPE of each H2S model. The H2S MAPE scores are
higher than the pressure or BTU model MAPEs. This higher error rate is also seen in
MAPE scores for the CO2 and the H2O signals (Figure 5.9 and 5.11). By normalizing
each signal and calculating its variance, we find that the H2S, CO2, and H2O signal
variability is higher than the pressure or BTU variability, thus explaining the higher
MAPE range.
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Figure 5.7: MAPE of all H2S forecasting models over the 30 time horizons
All H2S alarm forecasting models outperform the naïve model, except that the
AR(10) model fails over time horizons one through eight. MAPE errors range from 4.0 6.2%, with the ANN performing the best at 4.1%. The AR(10) model performs the worst,
exceeding 6% at time horizon 30.
Figure 5.8 shows the sensitivity of high alarms for each H2S model. The
sensitivity plot confirms the ANN to be the best performing H2S forecasting model.
However, all other models fail to predict more than 70% of high alarms correctly at time
horizon 30, perhaps because there are few high alarms in the H2S testing dataset. Table
3.3 shows the frequency of high alarms is less than 1%. With such a low occurrence rate
of high alarms, the sensitivity is not the best criteria by which to evaluate the H2S alarm
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forecasting models. Therefore, the MAPE plot (Figure 5.7) is considered to be a better
representation of the forecasting performance of the H2S model.

Figure 5.8: High alarm sensitivity of all H2S forecasting models over the 30 time
horizons
While the results for the H2S models are generally not as good as the pressure or
BTU models, the ANN forecasting 76% of the high alarms out of the few occurrences
that exist in the testing signal is promising. These results are similar as those seen for the
CO2 models presented next.
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5.8

Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Signal Alarm Forecasting Results

As discussed in Section 3.5, the CO2 signal is directly related to the H2S content
signal. Figure 5.9 presents the MAPE plot of all CO2 forecasting models below.

Figure 5.9: MAPE of all CO2 forecasting models over the 30 time horizons
Figure 5.9 shows that the ANN is the best model to forecast the CO2 signal. We see
that the naïve, AR(10), ARX, and Theta model results are grouped together over the 30
time horizons and forecast a maximum 4.0 – 5.2% error. While all the CO2 models
outperform the naïve basis comparison model, only the ANN performs under 1.5%
MAPE error at time horizon 30.
Figure 5.10 shows the CO2 low alarm sensitivity rate.
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Figure 5.10: Low alarm sensitivity of all CO2 forecasting models over the 30 time
horizons
The naïve model outperforms all but the ANN in the sensitivity plot. The worst
performer, the Theta method, forecasts low alarms just above a 50% success rate. The
Theta methods forecast is a combination of a local curvature forecast and linear trend.
The weighting of these components are of equal parts, but these results indicate that the
Theta model would benefit from a heavier weighting on curvature based on the volatility
of the CO2 signal. Figure 5.10 introduces the lowest sensitivity rates seen in any signal
thus far. The final signal, H2O, is examined next.
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5.9

Moisture Content Signal (H2O) Alarm Forecasting Results

The moisture content (H2O) signal contains periodic characteristics and has a
testing set that contains no high or high-high alarms. The MAPE of each H2O forecasting
model is presented below in Figure 5.11.

Figure 5.11: MAPE of all H2O forecasting models over the 30 time horizons
Due to a lack of high or high-high alarms, the low alarm will be analyzed with the
sensitivity plot. Despite a high alarm being more concerning to a pipeline operator, the
low alarm sensitivity gives an approximation of how well the models forecast general
H2O signal alarms.
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Figure 5.12: Low alarm sensitivity of all H2O forecasting models over the 30 time
horizons
Figure 5.12 shows that not all H2O forecasting models outperform the naïve model.
The models that failed to do this is the AR(10) and Theta, with sensitivity rates below
75% at time horizon 30. The ANN and ARX models outperformed the basis model, but
not by an amount that is statistically significant.

5.10

Overall Alarm Forecasting Model Comparison

This chapter presents four methods for alarm forecasting in natural gas production
pipelines. The results show all forecasting model performances in terms of RMSE,
MAPE, and sensitivity. Some models perform better than others, and other models
provide valuable insights in understanding the pipeline system as a whole. To
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demonstrate the contributions of this research, each model developed to forecast alarms is
tested against the current state-of-the-art forecaster used in the pipeline control room at
the start of this project.
Chapter 4 introduces the current state-of-the-art forecasting method used in the
pipeline control room. A weighted average of each signal recorded at 𝐶𝑃𝐹1 - 𝐶𝑃𝐹4 is used
to keep the pipeline operators aware of the quality of gas estimated to arrive at the
distribution point. This weighted average model (Section 4.3) is replaced by the naïve
model (Section 4.3) as the state-of-the-art alarm forecasting model after it was proven the
naïve model presented better results when forecasting alarms. The weighted average
model struggles to forecasting signal values outside the steady state range, which is
understandable as the system is in a steady state more than 95% of the time (Table 5.1).
The naïve model is accurate enough to give estimates signals up to 30 minutes in advance
(i.e., forecasts at least 50% of alarms correctly at time horizons 30) and forecasts rare
signal event with more consistency. The results above show each of our purposed
forecasting models outperform the weighted average and naïve model, allowing us to
draw final conclusions for the 10th-order autoregressive model (AR(10)), the
autoregressive model with exogenous variable (ARX), the Theta method, and the
artificial neural network (ANN) models.
The first conclusion is that the artificial neural network performs the best out of
all forecasting techniques. The ANN averages an alarm forecasting sensitivity of
approximately 94.2% for time horizon 5, 88.6% for time horizon 15, and 82.7% for time
horizon 30. This means we are confident the ANN predicts 82.7% of all alarms 30
minutes into the future. 30 minutes’ warning offers pipeline controllers more time to
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correct system issues that they otherwise would not have of until an alarm is already
triggered or the pipeline is shut in.
The autoregressive model with exogenous variables (ARX) performs second best.
Although performing poorly when forecasting CO2 alarms, the ARX model consistently
has the second lowest MAPE and RMSE when forecasting all other signals. The ARX
averages a sensitivity of 90.3% for time horizon 5, 81.8% for time horizon 15, and 79.1%
for time horizon 30. Both the ANN and the ARX use lagged exogenous variables (signals
being generated at the upstream central processing facility). We calculate lags in Section
4.4 by looking at the lagged cross-correlation of the distribution points signal and each
CPF. The success of these models shows that lagged gas quality signals coming from the
upstream CPFs influence the signals being recorded at the distribution point.
The AR(10) model is not as successful as the ARX or ANN, but still provides
useful information to understand the system we are forecasting. In cases where the
AR(10) outperforms the ARX (BTU forecasting, Figure 5.10), it is reasonable to assume
that the ARX’s exogenous variables are not significant when forecasting that signal, and
could possibly be hurting its performance. The same hypotheses could be formed about
the exogenous variables in ANN. The AR(10) averages a sensitivity of 87.5% for time
horizon 5, 79.6% for time horizon 15, and 71.2% for time horizon 30. The small amount
of information the AR(10) forecasts with can limit its ability to forecast at large time
horizons. The lowest performing model, the Theta method, also has higher error rates at
larger time horizons.
The Theta method produces an average sensitivity of 88.3% for time horizon 5,
77.0% for time horizon 15, and 66.8% for time horizon 30. The Theta method

89
outperforms the AR(10) in the early time horizons. However, because the Theta method
relays on an equal combination of local curvature and long-term trend information to
forecast, we see a significant drop in performance in the larger time horizons. Many of
the signal’s local curvatures at time 𝑡 are substantially different 𝑡 + 30 minutes into the
future. Hence, the Theta methods error rates increase more than usual the farther out it
forecasts. We discuss this limitation in the future work section of Chapter 6.
A major error metric used in this work is the sensitivity of a model forecasting a
specific alarm threshold. For all forecasting models, we encounter too few triggered
alarms to test all four alarm thresholds (high-high, high, low, low-low). Subsequently, we
test each model’s alarm forecasting accuracy with the alarm threshold that contains the
highest occurrence rate. This means if the testing set contains the highest number of low
alarms, the low alarm threshold is selected to calculate the sensitivity rates across all the
time horizons. The disadvantage of this decision is that we make assumptions on overall
model performance based on a sometimes-irrelevant alarm threshold. An example of this
is using a low alarm threshold to test the H2O forecasting models. Less moisture in the
pipeline is a good thing; hence, low alarms do not have the same importance as high or
high-high alarms. Similar concerns as this is expanded in the research summary in
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
Benefits of Alarm Forecasting in Natural Gas Pipelines and Future Work
Considerations

6.1

Chapter Objectives

Chapter 6 discusses the contributions of this thesis and suggests opportunities for
future work. The contributions of our research include an alarm forecasting framework
and four techniques to forecast alarms in natural gas production pipelines. Future work is
suggested based on the experience gained from this project and the initial response of the
pipeline controllers using the forecasting algorithms. Then, a conclusion is drawn about
the work.

6.2

Contributions of Our Work

Natural gas production companies use pipelines to transport natural gas from
point the extraction well to distribution point. This work helps a natural gas production
company achieve this goal by providing the tools needed to forecast pipeline alarms up to
30 minutes in advance. Pipeline alarms alert control room operators of immediate threats
to the system. Delaying action until after an alarm has been triggered is often costly
because damage may have already occurred, potentially leading to shutdowns, loss of
profit, and dangerous environments. This research shows how production pipelines can
avoid unprofitable consequences through the application of our alarm forecasting
algorithm. The alarm forecasting algorithms described in this work aid pipeline
controllers in achieving flow assurance and allow them to conduct preventative
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maintenance to decrease operation cost, unsafe working conditions, and damage to the
environment.
The top performing alarm forecasting algorithm in this research uses an artificial
neural network with exogenous variables to forecasts future pressure, heat content,
hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, and moisture content signals. The ANN averages an
alarm forecasting sensitivity of 94.2% for time horizon five, 88.6% for time horizon 15,
and 82.7% for time horizon 30. This outperforms the current state-of-the-art forecaster
(naïve model), which forecasts alarms five minutes into the future with an average
accuracy of 89.4%, 15 minutes into the future with an average accuracy of 83.8%, and 30
minutes into the future with an average accuracy of 74.1%. These higher accuracies
return a higher number of correctly predicted alarms. More correctly predicted alarms
return larger amounts of gas being sold to the distribution vendors, increasing profits, and
protecting equipment from long-term damage.
The forecasting framework requires little computational resources to operate,
provides real-time anomaly detection, and is developed to work seamlessly with existing
control room software. The framework is flexible enough to allow pipeline controllers to
change alarm thresholds at their discretion and add additional signals to be forecasted
with ease. The framework manages the forecasting algorithms and alerts the pipeline
controllers to immediate threats in the system.
A defining quality of this project was the decision to build our alarm forecasting
models using regression-based methods. The regression-based approach to predicting
alarms is used favoring a classification-based approach because the alarm thresholds can
be changed after the algorithm is deployed. In practice, unsafe and alarm-triggering
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values are avoided by control operators, which makes actual alarm occurrences in
reported data scarce. Since alarms are triggered when a threshold is exceeded, a
regression model cannot only predict when an alarm will trigger but tell expected values
at multiple time horizons to allow operators to perform more appropriate corrective
actions.

6.3

Future Work

This work presents several opportunities for future research. Forecasting alarms
with machine learning is commonly approached with either classification or regression.
Our initial search for alarm forecasting methods included a classification approach [90],
but because of the relative infrequency of positive cases of alarms, our classifier did not
perform well. The output of a classification-based model is binary: An alarm is either
present, or it is not present. Due to this nature of an alarm, this research problem will do
well to further explore the classification modeling techniques seen in industry.
For the techniques we did implement in this work, some can be expanded upon.
The Theta method is known for being one of the most robust time series forecasting
methods available. However, in our work, the Theta forecaster consistently performs
worst out of all methods. We believe this to be a penalty of our short-term forecasting, as
explained in Section 5.10. However, the optimization of tuning parameters mentioned in
[77], [81] as well as multivariate expansions of the Theta method [79] might benefit the
alarm forecasting model.
The artificial neural network (ANN) and autoregressive model with exogenous
variables (ARX) find success when using the lagged signal values from the central
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processing facilities upstream. All methods would benefit from further exploration of this
idea. In the models discussed in this work, only a one signal type is used as input to
forecast the same signal ℎ minutes into the future. That is, the hydrogen sulfide
forecasting models only take hydrogen sulfide signals as inputs. We speculate that if we
included other signals besides hydrogen sulfide as inputs to the hydrogen sulfide
forecaster, the relationship the hydrogen sulfide signal has with other signals might
uncover ways increase model performance.
The relationships between hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide discussed in
Chapter 3 introduces a chance to test this theory. The combination of high hydrogen
sulfide and carbon dioxide is a common reason for the pipeline to get shut in. If we were
to include both these signals with lagged observations in the training of the ANN and the
ARX model, the relationship between the two signals may help when forecasting at time
horizons beyond 30 minutes. This is just one example of where we might be able to
exploit the relationship of one signal to another to forecast alarms.
Looking to new signals entirely to forecast alarms at further time horizons may
prove beneficial. Chapter 2 points out that a pipeline control room is monitoring
anywhere from 80 to 100 signals at once. The models in this work use only the pressure,
heat content, carbon dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, and moisture content signals. If we can
access the other signals the control room is monitoring, a more robust forecaster may be
obtainable. For example, the internal pressure of the pipe is directly related to the amount
of gas being flown into it. If we acquired the flow-rate time series for each CPF and the
distribution point, the flow-rate data may improve our pressure forecasting ability. Other
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signals, such as machinery revolution-per-minute rates, may also help combat the
problem of human intervention in day-to-day operations.
The pipeline control room operators are trained to log unusual occurrences seen in
the pipeline. An example of an unusual occurrence would be if one of the central
processing facility’s dehydration units fails. If this event occurs, the control room
operators log the failure and instruct the pipeline workers to fix the issue. Our models are
not aware these events, which hurt our forecasting ability. If we could gain access to the
control log that the operators maintain, we may be able to develop an algorithm that
detects the failure and adjusts the forecasting models appropriately based on the type of
failure.
Natural gas production companies produce massive datasets every day. While the
production company sponsoring this work requested this specific alarm forecasting
project, there are many opportunities for improvement through all upstream production.
From leak detection to flow dynamics, new ideas are being applied to similar datasets
like the ones in this work to ensure the safe and reliable transportation of natural gas.

6.4

Conclusion

In conclusion, the alarm forecasting models in this thesis are powerful tools to help
natural gas production companies predictively maintain their pipeline. Forecasting alarms
help pipeline controllers avoid being shut-in, saving production companies significant
resources that otherwise would be spent on reactively maintaining the pipeline. The end
user of this work, the pipeline controller, contributed valuable insight to this project and
worked closely with us to explain the characteristics of the pipeline signals used in this
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research. Through our combined efforts, all alarm forecasting models outperform the
state-or-the-art forecaster being used by the production company, with the artificial
neural network successfully predicting 82.7% of all alarms 30 minutes in advance.
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